NELPI Energy Law Essay: The Legal Framework for Hydro-Quebec Imports by Prodan, Pamela
Tulsa Law Review 
Volume 28 
Issue 3 Mineral Law Symposium 
Spring 1993 
NELPI Energy Law Essay: The Legal Framework for Hydro-Quebec 
Imports 
Pamela Prodan 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Pamela Prodan, NELPI Energy Law Essay: The Legal Framework for Hydro-Quebec Imports, 28 Tulsa L. J. 
435 (2013). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol28/iss3/5 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by TU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Tulsa Law Review by an authorized editor of TU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please 
contact megan-donald@utulsa.edu. 
THE NELPI ENERGY LAW ESSAY
THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR
HYDRO-QUEBEC IMPORTS*
Pamela Prodant
I. INTRODUCTION .......................................... 436
II. THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT ............................ 437
III. HYDROELECTRIC DEVELOPMENT AT JAMES BAY ......... 440
IV. JAMES BAY TREATY ..................................... 443
V. UNITED STATES AND CANADIAN ELECTRICITY TRADE... 448
VI. UNITED STATES STATE AND FEDERAL REQUIREMENTS .. 449
A. Maine-The Public Utilities Commission Decision ..... 449
1. Overview ........................................ 449
2. Least Cost Planning .............................. 451
3. Small Power Production and Cogeneration ........ 452
4. Maine Energy Policy Act ......................... 454
5. Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity ... 454
6. Environmental Externalities ...................... 456
B. United States Department of Energy .................. 458
VII. CANADIAN PROVINCIAL AND FEDERAL LAW ............ 465
A. Qudbec Law ......................................... 465
B. Canadian Federal Framework ........................ 467
1. National Energy Board ........................... 467
2. Federal Environmental Review Process ............ 468
VIII. UNITED STATES-CANADA FREE-TRADE AGREEMENT ..... 471
IX. CONCLUSION ............................................ 474
* Winning essay of the Sixteenth Annual National Energy Law and Policy Institute Energy
Law Essay Competition.
t Member, Maine Bar. J.D., 1992, University of Maine School of Law. The author expresses
her appreciation to her colleagues and advisors whose encouragement and criticisms contributed to
the development of this piece.
1
Prodan: NELPI Energy Law Essay: The Legal Framework for Hydro-Quebec Impo
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1992
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
I. INTRODUCTION
Hydro-Qu6bec is a Canadian province-owned electric utility with
considerable hydroelectric generation resources. In 1987, Central Maine
Power Company (CMP or Company) proposed a major power purchase
of up to 900 MW from Hydro-Qu6bec. CMP represented that the power
purchase was to be drawn from Hydro-Qu6bec's entire system of power
resources, and was not to be tied to the development of any particular
future facility in Canada. Hydro-Qu6bec and the Maine utility promoted
Hydro-Qu6bec power as environmentally clean, cheap and reliable.
However, to meet future electric demand in the United States, Hydro-
Qu6bec plans to harness all the flowages of the James Bay rivers in the
unique fragile wilderness region of northern Quebec, to produce hydro-
electricity. Moreover, the James Bay region is inhabited by Cree and
Inuit people whose cultures are inextricably tied to the rivers and land
slated for permanent destruction by hydro development. Phase one of
the James Bay project had destructive impact and no environmental re-
view. Therefore, the affected native people, particularly the Cree, are
vehemently opposed to future development.'
Canadian hydroelectric power is viewed in the United States as an
environmentally clean resource, because water, the source of the power,
is considered clean, and because the generating facilities are in Canada.
In reality, large-scale hydroelectric generation has devastating ecological
consequences. Further, the environmental effects of electric power gen-
eration are of no different magnitude or seriousness because the site of
the generation is north of the border. Yet, projects that would not be
considered in the United States are proposed to be constructed over the
next decade across northern Canada.2
1. The Cree of Qu6bec have employed both public pressure and litigation to oppose further
James Bay developments. In the litigation arena, the Cree have intervened in United States proceed-
ings and in Canadian National Energy Board proceedings and have brought a number of legal ac-
tions in the Canadian courts. For a short narrative of the implications of the James Bay hydropower
projects, see Harry Thurston, Power in a Land of Rememberence, AUDUBON, at 52 (Nov.-Dec.
1991); Sam Howe Verhovek, Power Struggle, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1992, (Magazine) at 16; infra
part III. For an extensive look at the people and their resistance to the projects, see BOYCE RICH-
ARDSON, STRANGERS DEVOUR THE LAND (1991).
2. Discrimination Against Indigenous Peoples Transnational Investments and Operations on the
Lands of Indigenous Peoples, U.N. ESCOR, Commission on Human Rights, 43d Sess., Agenda Item
15, at 14, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1991/49 (1991) [hereinafter REPORT ON TRANSNATIONAL IN-
VESTMENTS AND OPERATIONS]. To illustrate the magnitude of the problem, the planned projects at
James Bay alone require three times as much total storage, and inundate more than five times as
much land as the 50-year-old Bonneville Power system on the Columbia River in the United States,
which includes Grand Coulee Dam. Hydro-Qu6bec also wants to build a hydroelectric megaproject
with Newfoundland, Canada's poorest province, on Labrador's Churchill River. Fred Langan,
Canadians Negotiate Power Project, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Sept. 18, 1991, at 7. In the late
[Vol. 28:435
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In 1989, the Maine Public Utilities Commission (PUC or Commis-
sion) turned down CMP's proposed Hydro-Qu6bec purchase.3 However
the PUC did not acknowledge that the importation of Hydro-Qu6bec
power would necessitate critical developments having environmental and
social impacts in Canada. Further, the PUC expressly left the door open
for a future Hydro-Quebec purchase. Meanwhile, Hydro-Qu6bec contin-
ues to market power in the United States. The two Commissioners com-
prising the majority that rejected the Hydro-Qu6bec purchase have left
the Commission. Legally, nothing precludes CMP from returning to the
Commission with a new Hydro-Qu6bec proposal. CMP currently re-
ceives power from Hydro-Qu6bee through the New England Power Pool
(NEPOOL), a regional operating entity composed of public and investor-
owned utilities.
This paper examines the legal framework for importing Hydro-Qu6-
bec power to Maine. Current state, national and international laws and
policies are examined as they affect the James Bay hydroelectric projects.
this article views the laws and policies in light of growing concern for the
environment, and in light of the need to take responsibility for environ-
mental destruction and for the policies causing it. Unfortunately, the
current framework for dealing with environment and development is in-
adequate. The United States and Canadian legal systems are structured
so as to promote wasteful and environmentally destructive energy devel-
opment. Indeed, these energy policies threaten the existence of a healthy
global ecosystem if they are not challenged and changed.
II. THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT
Earth Summit, the United Nations Conference on the Environment
and Development took place in Rio De Janeiro, Brazil, in June 1992.'
1960s, Hydro-Quebec built a 5,428 MW project at Churchill Falls in Labrador, at a time when oil
was about $1 per barrel, in a deal that turns out less than favorable to Newfoundland: Hydro-
Quebec bought all of the power from Newfoundland at 2.2 cents per kilowatt hour (kwh) for elec-
tricity until 2020, thereafter 1.6 cents per kwh until 2040. Id. The two proposed Labrador dams
would produce 3,088 MW of electricity, compared to the proposed James Bay Great Whale's 3,060
MW. Id. The Innu people in the affected, yet unceded, territory have protested the existing and
proposed hydroelectric projects by refusing to pay electric bills and by removing electric power
meters from residences. Peter Penashue, President of Innu Nation, Address at St. John's, New-
foundland (Nov. 5, 1992). See infra notes 21-24 and accompanying text for description of other
projects.
3. Re Central Maine Power Co., No. 88-111, slip op. (Me. P.U.C. Jan. 9, 1989); Re Central
Maine Power Co., Nos. 88-111 and 87-261, slip op. (Me. P.U.C. Jan. 23, 1989) [hereinafter Order].
The Commission on January 9 issued an abbreviated Statement of Commission Decision in the
Hydro-Qu~be proceeding, Docket No. 88-111, and two weeks later issued its full opinion. Commis-
sioners David Moskovitz and Cheryl Harrington constituted the majority.
4. Earth Summit took place twenty years after the Stockholm Conference on the Environment
1993]
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The gathering was the culmination of much attention and research di-
rected by the United Nations toward the environment in recent years,
beginning with the convening of the World Commission on Environment
and Development (WCED) in 1983.1 Earth Summit and its aftermath
could determine whether the nations of the world will cooperate and seri-
ously address the global crisis.6
The United Nations General Assembly established the WCED with
a mandate to 1) make recommendations for dealing with critical and in-
terlocking environment and development issues, 2) propose international
mechanisms for needed change, and 3) promote understanding and com-
mitment to action.7 Taking an uncommon approach, the WCED not
only commissioned expert papers, convened high-level panels, and heard
from distinguished world figures, but it also took evidence from
thousands of people, from all walks of life.8
According to the WCED, during this century the relationship be-
tween humanity and the natural world sustaining it has undergone a
profound change. With the twenty-first century approaching, human be-
ings have acquired the power to alter the earth's natural systems in major
and unintended ways.9 These changes are occurring so rapidly that our
scientific disciplines are unable to assess the impacts; and our political
and economic institutions, which evolved in a more fragmented world,
have been unable to adequately adapt and respond.10
The main concept of the WCED's report relating to government
launched the world-wide movement. For information on the Stockholm Conference, see LYNTON
KEITH CALDWELL, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 20 (1990).
5. Id at 93.
6. Id.
7. WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, OUR COMMON FUTURE 5
(1987). The WCED and its report are also known as The Brundtland Commission and The Brund-
tland Report, respectively, after Dr. Gro Harlem Brundtland, then Prime Minister of Norway, who
chaired the WCED.
8. James MacNeill, Where Do We Go From Here?, in TRIBUTE TO OUR COMMON FUTURE 64
(Jane Stuart, ed. 1988). In short, the WCED's conclusions about the global crisis are 1) no single
organization or government can, alone, solve the problems confronting us all, and 2) the problems
are interconnected and so are the solutions. Id. The WCED has provided numerous insights into
the problems leading up to and perpetuating global poverty and environmental degradation, and
how they interconnect. Effects of human activities are no longer neatly compartmentalized within
nations, sectors (energy, agriculture, trade), and broad areas of concern (environmental, economic,
social). WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, OUR COMMON FUTURE
(1987) reprinted in WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, FROM ONE
EARTH TO ONE WORLD: AN OVERVIEW BY THE WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND
DEVELOPMENT, at 11 (1987) (paper published by Oxford University Press) [hereinafter OVER-
VIEW]. The various global crises that have seized public attention are not separate crises, but rather,
all one. Id.
9. OVERVIEW, supra note 8, at 23.
10. Id.
[V/ol. 28:435
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conduct is "sustainable development". Sustainable development is eco-
nomically and ecologically sustainable development. It meets present
needs, without compromising future generations' ability to meet their
needs." "Sustainable global development requires that those who are
more affluent adopt lifestyles within the planet's ecological means - in
their use of energy, for example."12 According to the WCED, existing
laws are inadequate to protect future generations from the impacts of
present development.13 Nevertheless, we can acknowledge the limita-
tions of present technology and introduce a new era of sustainable
development. 14
One of the six priorities outlined in the Commission's full report1 5 is
to provide the legal means for creating sustainable development. Na-
tional and international laws are rapidly being outdistanced by the accel-
erating pace and expanding scale of impacts of development on the
environment. 6  In particular, the Commission asserts that
"[g]overnments now need to fill major gaps in existing national and inter-
national law related to the environment [and] to find ways to recognize
and protect the rights of present and future generations to an environ-
ment adequate for their health and well-being ... .'17 Public participa-
tion is essential to meeting the challenge.1
Energy is an especially important issue because it profoundly affects
11. Id. at 14.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 22.
14. Id. at 14.
15. Id. at 22.
16. Id.
17. Id. It is not simply a matter of changing laws, however. Institutions must change as well.
The objective of sustainable development and the integrated nature of the global envi-
ronment/development challenges pose problems for institutions, national and interna-
tional, that were established on the basis of narrow preoccupations and compartmentalized
concerns. Governments' general response to the speed and scale of global changes has been
a reluctance to recognize sufficiently the need to change themselves. The challenges are
both interdependent and integrated, requiring comprehensive approaches and popular par-
ticipation.
Yet most of the institutions facing those challenges tend to be independent, frag-
mented, working to relatively narrow mandates with closed decision processes. Those re-
sponsible for managing natural resources and protecting the environment are
institutionally separated from those responsible for managing the economy....
The other great institutional flaw in coping with environment/development chal-
lenges is governments' failure to make the bodies whose policy actions degrade the environ-
ment responsible for ensuring that their policies prevent the degradation. ...
The existence of such agencies gave many governments and their citizens the false
impression that these bodies were by themselves able to protect and enhance the environ-
mental resource base.
Id. at 15.
18. Id.
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the environment and people, perhaps more than most realize. Energy
production and use have environmental impacts greater than any other
development in the history of civilization. Yet, with world energy sup-
plies and markets in flux, and with new documentation of environmental
changes, the issues surrounding large scale energy developments have be-
come increasingly complex and volatile. Daily we receive new informa-
tion about the world energy situation, influencing our opinions about the
desirability of particular energy sources. As our knowledge grows, there
is an increasing urgency to heed the warnings of the WCED, and work
toward changing our institutions and laws to adequately address the
global crisis.
The solution must be comprehensive. "The ability to anticipate and
prevent environmental damage requires that the ecological dimensions of
policy be considered" contemporaneously with other dimensions such as
trade, energy, and economy. 9 "The real world of interlocked economic
and ecological systems will not change; the policies and institutions con-
cerned must."'2
III. HYDROELECTRIC DEVELOPMENT AT JAMES BAY
The full and cumulative impacts of large scale hydroelectric devel-
opment at James Bay have never been studied, but it is safe to assume
that the impacts go far beyond what anyone imagined when the projects
were first conceived.2" Presently, hydro development projects are pro-
posed not only for the James Bay watershed, but for the entire Hudson's
Bay watershed, involving rivers in the provinces of Ontario and Mani-
toba as well as Qu6bec.22 To date no adequate studies have been done of
19. IdL
20. Id The WCED and its conclusions exemplify the changing attitudes about development
around the world. Popular science writers now write matter-of-factly that everything on earth is
interconnected in complex ways into a single, finite global biosphere, without regard for national
borders, and that the tremendous impacts of large scale developments must be examined in the
context of entire ecosystems. David Suzuki, Environment Has Global Impact, THE GAZETrE (Mon-
treal), Oct. 5, 1991, at J6.
21. For example, Canadian scientists researching the relationship between flooding for hydroe-
lectric dams and global warming now believe that hydroelectric stations could contribute as much to
global warming as coal-fired power stations. Graeme Hamilton, Gagged Scientist's Study May Show
Hydro Power as Polluting as Coal, THE GAZETrE (Montreal), Oct. 11, 1991, at A8. The scientist,
who was prevented by his superiors at the Fisheries and Oceans Department from testifying at a
New York City hearing on the New York-Hydro-Quebec contract, says his research so far has indi-
cated that submerged vegetation will decay after flooding and release huge amounts of carbon diox-
ide and methane gas. Id. His research has been supported by colleagues. Terrence Wills, Scientist
Studying Great Whale Gives Ottawa a Damage Report, THE GAZETrE (Montreal), Nov. 28, 1991, at
D18.
22. Winona LaDuke, Address at Burlington, Vt. (Mar. 22, 1991); Graeme Hamilton, Damming
[Vol. 28:435
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the cumulative impacts of such development on the affected river ecosys-
tems. In addition to ambitious plans for hydroelectric development,
Quebec's Premier Robert Bourassa has advanced a plan for water diver-
sion to western Canada and the United States that would transform all or
part of the marine basin of James Bay into a vast freshwater reservoir.23
Consequently, the cumulative impacts of development projects threaten
to devastate the entire Hudson's Bay ecosystem, the continent's largest
estuarine system.24
As well as increasing the province's export capability, Hydro-Qu6-
bec's current hydroelectric expansion plans allow the utility to offer low-
cost power as an incentive for aluminum and magnesium smelters to
relocate to Qu6bec or expand their existing operations in Qurbec.25 Such
expansion will invariably lead to increased water and air pollution in the
region, and will contribute to the greenhouse effect.26
Already, during the first stage of the James Bay project, completed
in 1986, Hydro-Quebec has diverted three rivers into the La Grande
River, inundating 3,675 sq. km of forest and tundra.2 7 The diverted riv-
ers lost up to 90% of their natural flows, while the flow of the La Grande
River doubled.28 Since the dams are operated in response to demand for
electrical power in the south, and demand is greatest in the winter,
Hydro-Qu6bec stores water in the summer, reversing the natural seasonal
cycle of flow levels.29 The river alterations interfere with migration and
spawning of freshwater fish, and desiccate the estuarine wetlands used by
the Northern Rivers; Three Provinces Are Looking for Power in the James Bay Area, THE GAZETTE,
(Montreal) Oct. 5, 1991, at B4.
23. ROBERT BOURASSA, POWER FROM THE NORTH 133 (1985).
24. JOYCE ROSENTHAL & JAN BEYEA, LONG-TERM THREATS TO CANADA'S JAMES BAY
FROM HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 15 (1989) (National Audubon Society Environmental Policy Analy-
sis Department Report #29) [hereinafter ROSENTHAL & BEYEA]. The Hudson's Bay watershed
covers one third of Canada. Damming the Northern Rivers, Three Provinces are looking for Power in
the James Bay area, THE GAZETTE (Montreal), Oct. 5, 1991, at B4.
25. REPORT ON TRANSNATIONAL INVESTMENTS AND OPERATIONS, supra note 2, at 23. Envi-
ronmental groups obtained the names of a number of transnational corporations that reportedly
made secret agreements with Hydro-Quibec for James Bay power at prices below actual cost, but a
Quebec court blocked publication of the names of the transnationals with which Hydro-Qurbec
negotiated power contracts. Rhal S6guin & Andr6 Picard, Hydro-Qudbec selling cut-rate power to
firms, MNA says, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), Apr. 17, 1991, at Al.
26. New research shows that two obscure gases released during aluminum production, te-
trafluoromethane and hexafluoromethane, have a global warming impact more than 8,000 times that
of carbon dioxide. Graeme Hamilton, Qudbec's Smelters Spew Two Gases That Cause Greenhouse
Effect: Study, THE GAZETrE (Montreal), Jan. 25, 1992, at A5. The estimated warming effect of
gases released in aluminum smelting equals that of about 10% of Canada's total carbon dioxide
emissions. Id.
27. REPORT ON TRANSNATIONAL INVESTMENTS AND OPERATIONS, supra note 2, at 23.
28. Id.
29. ROSENTHAL & BEYEA, supra note 24, at 13-17.
19931
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migrating waterfowl for feeding.3"
Aside from the potentially devastating environmental impacts of
huge hydroelectric projects such as those proposed across northern Can-
ada, there is another troubling aspect to these developments: the particu-
larly great consequences for indigenous people.3a The impacts of the first
phase of hydroelelectric development on the cultures of the people indig-
enous to the James Bay region have been significant. The LaGrande
hydro-electric complex is one of the world's largest of its kind, revealing
its dams, dikes, service roads and construction scars in Landsat satellite
photos.32 Cree family trap lines have been flooded,33 and access roads
built for construction crews are now used by loggers and recreational
hunters, further undermining the Cree food system and culture.34 More-
over, the decay of organic matter in the reservoirs has caused the release
of mercury into the food chain, resulting by 1984 in mercury levels in
two thirds of the Cree population in excess of levels considered safe by
the World Health Organization.35
Such effects were not entirely unexpected. In 1974, when the Cree
sought to obtain a court injunction to stop the first stage of the projects, a
Qu6bec Superior Court predicted the impacts of the James Bay Project
would be devastating to the indigenous people and would result in the
destruction of the ecosystem. 36 The trial court granted the injunction,
30. Id
31. The reality that the people most adversely affected by the James Bay megaprojects are
indigenous peoples cannot be overlooked. Large-scale projects that change traditional land-use pat-
terns can have more far-reaching impacts on indigenous peoples than on non-indigenous peoples
because land plays such an important role in indigenous peoples' survival. REPORT ON TRANSNA-
TIONAL INVESTMENTS AND OPERATIONS, supra note 2, at 7. For instance, the indigenous peoples
of northern Canada still depend on wildlife and fisheries for a large proportion of their diet. Indeed,
not only their traditional subsistence activities, but their social structure and culture are largely
dependent on the land. The loss of the land means the loss of their traditions. In contrast, non-
indigenous peoples can and do relocate without losing their very cultural identity. Moreover, unlike
indigenous peoples, non-indigenous peoples seldom have use rights that have existed for thousands
of years. Id. In recent history, some of the most dramatic disruptions of indigenous societies have
been associated with hydroelectric development. Id. at 13. Dams built or planned worldwide since
1970 will displace an estimated two million people. Id. at 14. Activities with significant risks are
more likely to be sited on the lands of indigenous people, and as a practical matter, are less likely to
be supervised adequately, because of the remoteness of the areas. It is a small number of specialized
transnational corporations such as the Bechtel Corporation that have been the major beneficiaries of
the widespread development of hydroelectric power in developing countries on the land of indige-
nous peoples. Id. at 13. The regularity and frequency of the siting of such physically destructive
projects on traditional lands of indigenous peoples has been attributed to environmental racism. See
Thurston, supra note 1, at 58.
32. CHARLES SHEFFIELD, MAN ON EARTH How CIVILIZATION AND TECHNOLOGY
CHANGED THE FACE OF THE WORLD - A SURVEY FROM SPACE 38 (1983).
33. Grand Chief Matthew Coon-Come, Address, August, Me. (Apr. 20, 1989).
34. REPORT ON TRANSNATIONAL INVESTMENTS AND OPERATIONS, supra note 2, at 23.
35. Id.
36. See Kanatewat v. James Bay Dev. Corp. (1973), [1974] Que.P.R. 38 (Que. Sup. Ct.), rey'd,
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but within a week the Qu6bec Court of Appeals dissolved it. In a severe
blow to native rights and the environment, the Canadian Supreme Court
affirmed.37
IV. JAMES BAY TREATY
The traditional policy of Europeans toward Native people has been
summarized as follows:
From the earliest days of European settlement in North America, the
relationship between Indians and non-Indians was characterized by an
assumption on the part of colonial governments that native people had
an interest in the land which had to be dealt with before non-native
settlement or development could take place.38
More recently, the Canadian Supreme Court has stated, "the nature of
the Indians' interest is therefore best characterized by its general inalien-
ability, coupled with the fact that the Crown is under an obligation to
deal with the land on the Indians' behalf when the interest is
surrendered. '3
9
In spite of this traditional respect for the sovereignty of native lands,
the Qu6bec government unilaterally announced its proposals for the
(1975), [1975] C.A. 166, leave to appeal refused (1973), 41 D.L.R. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.). The opinion
states:
The major rivers in the territory will be completely transformed. The flow of some
will be cut off, reduced, increased, or diverted. Others will be formed into a series of lakes.
Changes in the flow of rivers and the creation of reservoirs will flood many lakes. The beds
and banks of rivers will be eroded. Areas of dry land will be flooded. The normal spring
flood will not occur. The wetland habitat on which so many animals depend will be de-
stroyed. The lichen area will be reduced significantly.
The works will have an adverse effect on the birds, the fish, the animals, and aquatic
life generally. The number of animals will be reduced significantly. Petitioners will no
longer be able to make use of the fruits of the soil. They will no longer be able to hunt,
trap, and fish in the areas affected. The ecological balance which existed in the region will
be seriously disturbed. The mutual relations existing between the organisms and their en-
vironment will be completely upset. The environment will be changed. According to Fen-
ton, the whole system which took 8,000 years to develop will be destroyed.
In view of the dependence of the indigenous population on the animals, fish, and vege-
tation in the territory, the works will have devastating and far reaching effects on the Cree
Indians and the Inuits living in the territory and the lands adjacent thereto.
For further description of the actual social and environmental impacts nearly 20 years later, see
Thurston, supra note 1. For a more detailed description of the likely cumulative environmental
impacts of James Bay development, see ROSENTHAL & BEYEA, supra note 24, at 13-20.
37. See Kanatewat v. James Bay Dev. Corp., (1975), [1975] C.A. 166, rev'g (1973), [1974]
Q.P.R. 38 (Que. Sup. Ct.), leave to appeal refused (1973), 41 D.L.R. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.). See also infra
notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
38. CANADIAN OFFICE OF NATIVE CLAIMS, NATIVE CLAIMS: POLICY, PROCESSES, AND PER-
SPECTIVEs 2 (1978) (emphasis added).
39. Gu&in v. R. (1984), 13 D.L.R. (4th) 321, 339. Of course, this statement begs the question
as to what obligation the Crown is under, if any, before the interest is surrendered.
1993]
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James Bay region in April 1971. 40 The Cree people had never ceded
their ancestral lands, 41 yet the province did not consult with the Cree
first to tell them it planned to dam the rivers, flood their traplines and
their ancestral graves.42 This unilateral invasion on the part of the prov-
ince, prior to negotiating any treaty under which the Cree might surren-
der certain rights to their land was a violation of Cree sovereignty and
self-determination.
The Cree attempted to stop Hydro-Qu6bec. After six months of tes-
timony by environmentalists, trappers and engineers, the Cree were able
to obtain a court injunction to stop Hydro-Qu6bec construction in No-
vember of 1973.4 1 The Superior Court found that the project was clearly
inconsistent with the existence of the aboriginal title of the indigenous
population and issued an interim injunction to restrain the construc-
tion.' However, the Qu6bec Court of Appeals overturned the injunction
a week later. The court concluded that the aboriginal title of the Cree
and Inuit of James Bay was extinguished by the Hudson Bay Company
Charter of 1670, and, due to the Middle East oil embargo, that the bal-
ance of convenience ran against the native people.45 In other words, the
law allows inconveniences in the lifestyle of a small segment of the popu-
lation if there are advantages for the population as a whole.46
Due to their failure to halt the project in the court system, the Cree,
in their present chief's words, "decided to seek a negotiated settlement in
the face of this crass show of power" by the provincial government
against the native people.47 The resulting settlement became known as
40. CANADIAN OFFICE OF NATIVE CLAIMS, supra note 38, at 8.
41. Id. at 7. The Qu6bec Boundaries Extension Act of 1912 transferred the area north of the
Eastmain River from the Northwest Territories to the jurisdiction of Quebec, but with the provision
that Quebec recognize the native people's rights in the territory and obtain surrenders of such rights
in the same manner as the Canadian government had. Id.
42. Grand Chief Matthew Coon Come, Address Before the International Bar Association,
Strasbourg, France (Oct. 4, 1989).
43. Kanatewat v. James Bay Dev. Corp. (1973), [1974] Q.P.R. 38 (Que. Sup. Ct.), rev'd, (1975),
[1975] C.A. 166, leave to appeal refused (1973), 41 D.L.R. (3d) I (S.C.C.). Judge Malouf rejected
Qu~bec's argument that the territory was given to the Hudson Bay Company, citing a case affirmed
by the Supreme Court of Canada in which the judge stated that "[that fact is not important because
the Government of Canada has treated all Indians across Canada, including those living on lands
claimed by the Hudson Bay Company, as having an interest in the lands that required a treaty to
effect its surrender." R. v. Sikyea (1964), 43 D.L.R. (2d) 150, 152 (S.C.C.).
44. Kanatewat (1973), [1974] Q.P.R. 38 (Que. Sup. Ct.).
45. Kanatewat (1975), [1975] C.A. 166, 185 ("The preponderance of the evidence submitted on
the petition for an interlocutory injunction was to the effect that the inconvenience to Appellants
resulting from the stoppage of the work on the project would be far greater than the inconvenience
to Respondents in the event that work on the project is allowed to continue.").
46. Id.
47. Grand Chief Matthew Coon Come, supra note 42.
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the James Bay and Northern Qu6bec Agreement and was effected by par-
allel federal and provincial legislation six years after Quebec initiated the
projects.48 It gave the Cree control of education, health and social serv-
ices, rights with respect to the land, a system of justice and police protec-
tion, a voice in the approval of new projects in the territory, and
guarantees of major and important participation in the development of
sub-Arctic Qu6bec. 49
Under the Agreement, the Cree received compensation, but they did
not sell their land.5 0 Instead, the Agreement acknowledged the Cree and
Inuit people's traditional use and occupancy of the land and translated
these traditional rights into well-defined cultural, social, and economic
rights and benefits including environmental protection guarantees.51
This provided the native people of Northern Qu6bec with a substantial
degree of control over their future political, economic, and social
evolution.
5 2
48. CANADIAN OFFICE OF NATIVE CLAIMS, supra note 38, at 8. The signatories to the Agree-
ment are the federal government of Canada, the Quebec provincial government, the Grand Council
of the Cree (of Qu6bec), the Northern Qu6bec Inuit Association, the Soci&6 d'Energie de la Bale
James, and Hydro-Qu6bec.
49. Grand Chief Matthew Coon Come, supra note 42. The Cree, under the James Bay Agree-
ment, have structures of government consisting of 1) eight Cree Community Councils providing
municipal management of the Cree villages and 1,274 square miles of Category 1A land, containing
the villages, set aside essentially as reserves; 2) eight Cree Community Corporations which have as
their purpose surface ownership and management of 884 square miles of Category lB lands, which
are entirely under provincial administration and can be expropriated by Qu6bec; 3) the Cree Re-
gional Authority, a corporation under Qu6bec law that includes all Cree of James Bay and their
Community Corporations; 4) five joint entities in which the Cree share the administration of envi-
ronmental, wildlife and economic matters with the various levels of government; 5) other Cree-only
bodies that govern health, education and social services, administer proceeds of the settlement, or
develop trapping, tourism and handicrafts. CANADIAN OFFICE OF NATIVE CLAIMS, supra note 38,
at 16. The powers of the community corporations cover environment, social welfare and natural
resources on Category 1B lands, while the powers of the community councils cover residence, licens-
ing, surface resources, taxation, land use, public works, environment, social, sub-division, and non-
seizure. Id.
50. Grand Chief Matthew Coon, supra note 42.
51. CANADIAN OFFICE OF NATIVE CLAIMs, supra note 38, at 8.
52. Contra RICHARD H. BARTLETT, ABORIGINAL WATER RIGHTS IN CANADA 221-22 (Cana-
dian Institute of Resources Law 1988):
... The Cree and Inuit do not have control of major hydroelectric development because
the principal areas where such might be undertaken are excluded from Category I lands
and were identified as areas subject to future development by the Soci&t6 d'energie de la
Baie James. The Agreement secured only participation in the consideration of the environ-
mental consequences of developments, albeit only advisory in nature and confined to the
"ecological impact" with respect to designated hydro developments.... The Cree and
Inuit were denied an administrative role [in the management] of water resources outside
the confines of Category I lands.
It is not clear that the Treaty abrogated other rights. For example, traditionally, an Indian band on
a reserve can bring action to restrain pollution, if the pollution precludes hunting, trapping, fishing,
cultivation, and domestic uses. Id. at 69. The Cree may also have rights against pollution implied in
the treaty or coming out of their rights under international human rights law.
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The James Bay and Northern Qu6bec Agreement is a "modem"
treaty that provides for the settlement of aboriginal title, and contains
promises with respect to the land and resources.5 3 The Agreement sets
aside areas as reserves, and a regime provides for the participation of the
native people in future hydroelectric development.5 4 The Cree people
maintain that the Agreement gives them a veto over future development
in the territory. Native rights are described in the Agreement. How-
ever the terms of the Agreement are more directed to the rights and pow-
ers of the province and the Socit6 d'Energie de la Baie James with
respect to the water resources, than to the rights of the Cree and Inuit. 6
Despite the protections afforded by the Agreement, economic and polit-
ical pressures create a political climate favorable to hydroelectric devel-
opment. Thus, the protections offered by the Agreement have been
difficult to enforce. 7
The Cree maintain that Qu6bec has been negligent in implementing
Section 22 of the James Bay Agreement, the regime for environmental
protection, by failing to provide the necessary resources to properly re-
view the environmental impacts of the projects.5 8 In the early 1970s,
Qu6bec passed legislation to avoid environmental review of the La
53. See generally, id at 219-222.
54. Id. at 16.
55. Augusta Dwyer, The Trouble at Great Whale, EQUINOX, Jan./Feb., 1993 at 33.
56. BARTLETr, supra note 52, at 220-21.
57. The Cree have brought a number of lawsuits to compel the Canadian and Qu6bec govern-
ment to comply with the Agreement. See, eg., Cree Regional Auth. v. Canada, [1991] 2F.C. 422,
aff'd [1991] 3 F.C. 533. These actions are still in various stages of appeal and so it would be prema-
ture to draw any conclusions. However, if the lower court decisions hold, the federal government
will be required to abide by the treaty as law, and conform to the procedures created by the agree-
ment for a full environmental review of proposed developments at Great Whale. See Kevin Dough-
erty, Crees Gain 'upper hand' in Hydro-Quibec Battle, FIN. P6ST, Sept. 16, 1991, § 1, at 3.
58. Grand Chief Matthew Coon Come, supra note 42. The Federal government has been
equally lax. Sections 22 and 23 of the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement and the North-
ern Quebec Native Claims Settlement Act require that the Federal Administrator conduct environ-
mental and social impact assessment and review procedures. When the James Bay Corporation
called for bids for the clearing for an access road and construction of the Great Whale project, and
the Federal Administrator told the Cree that he had no mandate to apply the federal impact assess-
ment review procedure under the Agreement, the Cree petitioned for and were granted an order of
mandamus against him, ordering him as Federal Administrator to comply with Sections 22 and 23
in regard to the proposed Great Whale project. Cree Regional Auth. v. Canada, [1991] 2F.C. 422,
aff'd [1991] 3F.C. 533. The court held that Parliament intended the Agreement to operate as a
substantive enactment, as if the Agreement had become part of the federal statutes, and found juris-
diction for considering a grant of mandamus or an injunction. In Justice Rouleau's words, "this
agreement was signed in good faith for the protection of the Cree and Inuit peoples, not to deprive
them of their rights and territories without due consideration." Id. at 432. Justice Rouleau said he
was directed by the words of Chief Justice Dickson in R. v. Sparrow (1990), 1 S.C.R. 1075, in which
courts are directed that "the sovereign's intention must be clear and plain if it is to extinguish aborig-
inal rights." Cree Regional Auth. v. Canada, supra, at 432.
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Grande project and weakened the environmental review process for fu-
ture hydroelectric projects.5 9 Because of the failure of the government to
review the effects, the Cree themselves have provided most of the envi-
ronmental critique of the projects at their own expense.'
Although a Canadian court of appeals ruling provides for a full re-
view of future James Bay hydroelectric projects under the review process
provided by the James Bay Agreement, Ottawa still maintains that the
Agreement does not apply to the review.61 Instead, the federal govern-
ment would rather apply the Federal Environmental Assessment Review
Process (EARP) which the government maintains does not give it the
authority to stop the projects.62
The underhandedness of Quebec's approach in proceeding with the
early James Bay projects without first negotiating with the Cree and In-
uit calls into question the adequacy of the ensuing Agreement. At the
very least, because of the one-sidedness of the negotiations leading to the
Agreement, it should not operate to deprive the Cree people of their right
to control their own destiny.63 The Cree would like to see alternatives to
new hydro megaprojects explored first, such as cogeneration, conserva-
tion and small hydroelectric dams. These suggestions make eminently
more sense from the standpoint of sustainable development than the
large-scale hydroelectric proposals now planned by Hydro-Qurbec. Yet
there appears to be no mechanism in the Agreement, nor in Canadian or
Qu6bec law, to ensure that such alternatives be explored.
59. Grand Chief Matthew Coon Come, supra note 42. See infra notes 164-172 and accompany-
ing text.
60. Id.
61. See Cree Regional Auth. v. Canada, (1991), [1992] IF.C. 440; Graeme Hamilton, Great
Whale Needs OK from Ottawa, Court Rules, THE GAzETTE (Montreal), Sept. 11, 1991 at Al.
62. Id. See infra part VII.B.2. for a discussion of the EARP. Whether the federal government
has authority to stop the projects under the EARP is undecided. Ottawa may not want authority to
stop the projects because of the delicate constitutional situation, with Qu6bec threatening to declare
its sovereignty from Canada. The EARP requires that the assessment process be initiated "as early
in the planning process as possible and before irrevocable decisions are taken." Environmental As-
sessment and Review Process Guidelines Order, 118 CANADA GAZETrE, No. 14, Para. 3, at 2795
(July 11, 1984) [hereinafter EARP Guidelines Order].
63. The "generally accepted view" of treaty interpretation is that "Indian treaties should be
given a fair, large and liberal construction in favor of the Indians." Simon v. R. (1985), 24 D.L.R.
(4th) 390, 401 (citing Nowegijick v. R. (1983), 144 D.L.R. (3d) 193 and Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S.
1, 11 (1899)).
1993]
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V. UNITED STATES AND CANADIAN ELECTRICITY TRADE
Since 1970, United States utilities have purchased increasing quanti-
ties of electricity from Canadian utilities.' Such purchases have oc-
curred primarily because Canadian provincial utilities had electricity that
was surplus to their needs and could offer it to United States utilities at a
price which was less than what it cost United States utilities to produce
electricity in their own power plants. 5 However, it is undisputed that
the import of Canadian electricity to the United States has also acceler-
ated the development of hydroelectric dams in Northern Qu6bec. 6
That United States contracts with Hydro-Qu6bec will necessitate
new developments in Canada is clear because of the size of the contracts
and the nature of the power promised in the agreements. Of the two
basic types of purchase agreements between United States and Canadian
utilities, one, consisting of economy and surplus energy contracts, gener-
ally allows United States utilities to displace generation at their own ex-
isting generating facilities.6 7 This type of agreement does not necessarily
require building new capacity in Canada, although it may. Instead,
United States utilities take delivery of Canadian energy under the con-
tract when it is available and less expensive than their domestically gen-
erated power.68
The other type of purchase agreement, consisting of firm power and
firm energy contracts, provides with certainty that generation capacity
exists to meet the needs of the United States utility.69 With these con-
tracts, the United States utility can rely on the capacity purchased almost
as it would on its own internally generated capacity.70 By entering into a
Canadian contract for both firm energy and firm power the United States
64. See generally, UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CANADIAN POWER IM-
PoRTs - A GROWING SOURCE OF U.S. SUPPLY 12-23 (Apr. 1986). [hereinafter U.S. GAO CANA-
DIAN POWER IMPORTS] "Net imports of Canadian electricity grew from 2.4 million megawatt
hours (MWH) in 1970 to 39.5 million MWH in 1984." Id. at 3.
65. UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CANADIAN POWER IMPORTS - UPDATE
ON ELECTRICITY IMPORTS IN THE NORTHEAST 2 (March 1989) [hereinafter U.S. GAO ELECTRIC-
ITY IMPORTS].
66. See QUEBEC MINISTIRE DE L'ENERGIE ET DES RESSOURCES, ENERGY: DRIVING FORCE
OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 3 (1988) ("Proceeding ahead of schedule for the construction of all
the power plants in Hydro-Qu~bec's installations program was made possible by the effective can-
vassing of export markets.").
67. U.S. GAO CANADIAN POWER IMPORTS, supra note 64, at 16.
68. Id. "Generally, economy transactions are ... hours in duration while surplus sales may
cover several years." Id.
69. Id. "A firm power contract requires the Canadian utility to make generating capacity avail-
able to the United States utility on demand during the contract period." Id. at 17. A firm energy
contract requires the Canadian utility to deliver a specific amount of energy over an agreed upon
period of time. Id.
70. Id. at 17.
[Vol. 28:435
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utility avoids the siting and permitting requirements for construction of
new generating facilities in the United States and any accompanying ad-
verse public relations. The most recent United States contracts Hydro-
Qu6bec has negotiated in the past few years, including the contract with
Central Maine Power Company, have had provisions for firm energy and
firm power.71 Such firm contracts require the construction of additional
generating facilities in Canada. A large enough contract for economy or
surplus energy, such as the purchases involved in the NEPOOL Phase I
and II EIS, would also require building additional Canadian capacity.
VI. UNITED STATES STATE AND FEDERAL REQUIREMENTS
A. Maine-The Public Utilities Commission Decision
1. Overview
On January 9, 1989, almost two years after Central Maine Power
had applied for approval, the Maine Public Utilities Commission turned
down the Company's request for a Certificate of Public Convenience and
Necessity for its contract to import power from Hydro-Qu6bec. 2 The
PUC decided that CMP had not proven that a Hydro-Qu6bec purchase
would be less costly to customers than the alternatives of conservation
and in-state power production from qualifying facilities (QFs). It is im-
portant to understand what the Commission did not decide: it did not
decide that Maine should not import power from Hydro-Qu6bec's James
Bay projects. The true extent of the Commission's decision was that the
two principal alternatives to Hydro-Qu6bec- energy conservation and
power from cogeneration and small power production- had not been
adequately explored.73 Although the denial of the permit had the effect
of preventing CMP from continuing in the Hydro-Quebec contract,74 it
71. Order, supra note 3, at 9.
72. Id. at 2. The Hydro-Quebec proposal included the siting and construction of a new high
voltage transmission line. Before construction on the line could begin, the PUC would have had to
issue two Certificates of Public Convenience and Necessity: one for the contract, and one for the
transmission line. Because the PUC did not issue a Certificate for the contact, there was no proceed-
ing on the transmission line. Other Maine agencies that would have had to issue permits for the
transmission line to be built include the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP), the Land
Use Regulatory Commission, and the Department of Transportation. The laws and regulations of
these agencies as they would have applied to the proposed transmission line are not examined in any
depth in this paper because no formal proceedings before the agencies had taken place before the
PUC rejection. However, it is clear that DEP intended no examination of global impacts related to
the source of power, only the transmission line. See MAINE STATE PLANNING OFFICE, PRELIMI-
NARY REPORT ON THE EFFECTS OF THE PROPOSED PURCHASE OF POWER FROM HYDRO-QUfiBEC,
Appendix 2-A, at 1 (May 19, 1987).
73. Order, supra note 3 at 2.
74. Delays in the permit approval and construction schedule caused by the PUC rejection
19931
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was not the PUC's purpose to preclude a Hydro-Qu6bec purchase. In
announcing its decision, the PUC carefully explained that a Hydro-Qu6-
bec contract was likely to be approved in the future.7"
The PUC expressly stated in its decision that it had received no ex-
pert testimony on environmental impacts.76 However, the Commission
did agree that testimony by two witnesses as to the nexus between global
warming and energy resource planning was credible and rational.77 Yet,
in no way did the PUC attempt to consider in its evaluation of costs any
of the global environmental costs related to the development of hydroe-
lectric resources in Canada.78 The PUC did not even consider environ-
mental costs that would be associated with environmental impacts from a
Hydro-Qu6bec transmission line or from the alternatives.79
At the heart of the decision was nothing more than CMP's refusal to
sit down and negotiate with QFs, consisting of cogenerators and small
power producers, to determine price and availability just as CMP had
meant that Hydro-Quebec could not expect to start delivery of contracted energy before the sched-
uled initial date of delivery (IDD), even if a transmission line to Maine were ultimately approved.
Since the contract contained a provision allowing either CMP or Hydro-Quebec to pull out of the
contract without penalty if the transmission line did not meet an IDD of Dec. 31, 1993, Order, supra
note 3, at 15, Hydro-Qu6bec canceled the CMP contract on Oct. 17, 1989. Canadian Utility Will
Cancel Contract with CMP, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, Oct. 17, 1989, at 30. Due to a law enacted
while the Hydro-Qu6bec proceeding was pending, an electric utility now may not enter into such a
contract for a large purchase without first obtaining the Certificate of Public Convenience and Ne-
cessity. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 35-A, § 3133-A (West 1988). The signing of the Hydro-Qu6bec
contract had become a media event before a single permit for the proposal had been issued, raising
questions of propriety.
75. Re Central Maine Power Co., No. 88-111, slip op. at 2-3 (Me. P.U.C. Jan. 9, 1989). The
Commissioners stated:
Notwithstanding our denial, it is clear that Canadian power has and will continue to be an
important part of Maine's electric energy mix. Our denial of this particular contract does
not mean that new sources of power from Hydro-Qu6bec will be absent from our future.
Indeed, given Hydro-Qu6bec's enormous hydro-electric resources and the fact that we
share a common border makes it more likely than not that truly competitive power con-
tracts can be successfully consummated with Hydro-Quebec in the future.
Id.
76. Id
77. Id. Notwithstanding, in response to testimony by the PUC staff of the likelihood of funda-
mental changes in global energy perspectives and a resultant fall in load requirements, the Commis-
sion concluded that none of the Company's energy resource plans, including the Hydro-Qu6bec
purchase, was inherently inconsistent with a zero load growth scenario, and also that neither the
Hydro-Qu6bec plan nor the likely alternatives would be likely to exacerbate the greenhouse effect.
Id.
78. Order, supra note 3, at 77.
79. See id., at 102; see also Re Central Maine Power Co., No. 87-268, slip op. at 2-3 (Me.
P.U.C. Feb. 9, 1988) (Hearing Examiner's Evidentiary Ruling). Docket No. 87-268 was the Hydro-
Qu6bec proceeding after the first reffling, but before the refiling that acquired the final docket
number, 88-111. Because CMP was allowed to withdraw and refile its petition twice, the Hydro-
Qu6bec proceeding was spread over three dockets.
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done with Hydro-Qu6bec. The Commission had instructed CMP in writ-
ten orders more than once during the proceeding that the Company must
negotiate.80 To the Commission, the benefits of Hydro-Qu6bec appeared
slight and if CMP had adequately explored the conservation and QF al-
ternatives, it appeared the Hydro-Qu6bec alternative would have fared
worse.
81
Despite the deficiency in CMP's case, the Hydro-Qu6bec proceeding
was a lengthy, complex and expensive proceeding. It was also accompa-
nied by an extraordinary public relations campaign, much of which was
devoted to convincing the public "that Maine needs the additional power
and that Hydro-Qu6bec is a good deal for the people.... It's inexpensive
and reliable, and the environmental impacts of a power line are mini-
mal."82 In a February 1991 rate case decision, the PUC allowed CMP to
recover in its rates the approximately $10 million it had spent in promot-
ing the Hydro-Quebec project, including the public relations campaign.83
The legal framework for the PUC decision in the Hydro-Qu6bec is more
closely examined below.
2. Least Cost Planning
Maine statutory law and PUC regulations require electric utilities to
engage in least cost planning.84 As part of least-cost planning, PUC rules
require each major electric utility in Maine to file a set of energy resource
plans that analyze the way generating units, purchased power, and en-
ergy management programs are used "to meet the utility's projected de-
mands with the lowest practicable operating and capital costs."85
Creating and following the plan with the lowest costs is least-cost
planning.
80. Order, supra note 3, at 114-116. "The only way to determine whether specific proposals can
compete with Hydro-Qu6bec is to continue negotiations with QFs. In our view ME. REv. STAT.
ANN. tit. 35-A, §§ 3305(1) & 3306(2) (West 1988), and rules promulgated thereunder, require CMP
to negotiate in good faith with QFs." Order, supra note 3, at 116 (citing Re Central Me. Power Co.,
No. 88-111 slip op., at 4-5 (Me. P.U.C. June 7, 1988) (Order Denying No Thank Q Hydro-Qu6bec's
Motion for Judgment).
81. Order, supra note 3, at 2.
82. RANDY WILSON, CMP's $10 Million Sales Pitch, 21 MAINE TIMES, No. 10, 1, at 12 (Dec.
9, 1988) (quoting CMP's Director of Public Relations).
83. Re Central Maine Power, Co., No. 90-076, slip op. (Me. P.U.C.) (Proposed Increase in
Rates).
84. Re Least Cost Planning Performance Proposals, No. 88-310, slip op. at I (Me. P.U.C. Jan.
6, 1989) (Order Commencing Rulemaking - Chapter 382) (citing the Maine Energy Policy Act of
1988, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 35-A, § 3191; Me. P.U.C. Reg. 360 and Reg. 380; and provisions of
the Electric Rate Reform Act, ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 35-A, § 3153-A.
85. RICHARD B. PARKER, Will the Electric Company Learn to Love Energy Efficiency? A Policy
Experiment at the Maine PUC, 36 MAINE BUSINESS INDICATORS, No. 2, at 2 (1991).
1993]
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The goal of least cost planning is "to minimize the total cost of serv-
ing the expected total set of customer requirements for light, heat, cool-
ing, motor drive and other services of electricity."86 In its analysis, the
utility must consider not only what it would cost to build and operate its
own power plants, but also alternatives to new power plants, such as
purchasing power from other sources, utility-sponsored conservation,
and load management.87 As it is currently implemented, least cost plan-
ning does not expressly take into account the social or environmental
costs of the source, unless they directly impact upon rates.88
3. Small Power Production and Cogeneration
The Small Power Production and Cogeneration Act was enacted in
1987 to reduce the Maine's dependence on fossil fuels for its energy use,
86. Id. Dr. Parker, Director of the Maine PUC Technical Analysis Division, explains that a
paradox would seem to exist in that least cost may not always mean lowest rates: because a utility
faces fixed costs for maintaining its infrastructure, fewer kilowatt hours sold means that each kilo-
watt hour must now cost more in order to cover the fixed costs. In addition, because utility-spon-
sored efficiency measures incur most costs as capital expenditures for items such as insulation and
improvements in lighting and motors, their greatest rate impacts occur up front in the early years of
the measures' lives. Id However, the upward rate impacts of customers who do take advantage of
energy management are more than offset by the reduction of the bill from the kilowatt-hours saved,
relative to what the new and more expensive power supply would have cost had conservation not
been pursued. Id. Even customers who do not participate in utility-sponsored efficiency programs
benefit if they do not incur increased rates that would be caused by expensive new power supply
sources. In 1991, a utility-initiated bill by was drafted for the Maine Legislature that would have
made "least cost" mean "lowest rates," forcing the PUC to abandon the least total cost approach to
providing energy services. See Central Maine Power Co., Draft Titles (filed at Me. P.U.C. Jan. 7,
1991).
87. Parker, supra note 85, at 2.
88. Insofar as the Maine Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) is empowered to
modify facilities in location, size, character or design under ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 484
(West 1988) the PUC would reopen its original decision and again make specific findings with regard
to the need for the facilities. Title 35-A, § 3133(7). The Commission could have considered the
impact to the Maine economy of importing Hydro-Qu6bec power versus producing it in the state.
Order, supra note 3, at 122. Basing a decision on such testimony is permissible under Maine law, but
not required. Id., at 118; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 35-A, § 3133(9) (West 1987 & Supp. 1990).
The statute states in part:
Importedpower. In its review of any petition filed on or after January 1, 1987, for approval
of the purchase of generating capacity or energy from outside the State, the commission
may consider the comparative economic impact on the State of production of additional
power within the State, investments in energy conservation and the purchase of the power
from outside the State.
The Office of the Public Advocate, part of the executive department and answerable to the governor,
had originally intended to address these economic issues in its direct case. Request for Reconsidera-
tion, letter from Public Advocate to Commission at 3 (February 10, 1988). However, the only at-
tempt to quantify the overall impact on the state, appearing in two studies performed by the State
Planning Office (SPO), was never offered for the truth of the matters contained in the studies. Order,
supra note 3, at 122. Even though the SPO studies would have led the PUC to conclude that the net
economic effects of QFs and conservation would be superior to the Hydro-Qu6bec proposal, the
Commissioners did not consider them in its opinion since the studies were not part of the evidentiary
record. Id.
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to diversify energy resources, and to encourage the development of small
energy production and cogeneration facilities. 9 The Act provides for the
sale of electricity by QFs, or small power producers and cogenerators, to
electric utilities without the prior approval of the Commission. 90 If a QF
and an electric utility cannot agree to a contract or price, on request of
one of the parties, the PUC will require the utility to purchase the power
from the QF at the avoided cost.9
The cost that a utility pays to a QF cannot exceed the cost of the
electric energy that the utility would generate or purchase from another
source if it were not buying the power from the QF.92 This avoided cost
is calculated by the utility, subject to review and approval of the PUC.93
The statutory requirements with respect to qualifying facilities
played a role in the Hydro-Qu6bec proceeding. In the spring of 1987,
CMP issued a Request for Proposals (RFP) for the purchase of QF
power to fill the 7th and 8th decrements (87-A and 87-B). 94 The re-
sponse to the RFP was so great that it immediately raised questions as to
the need for a Hydro-Qu6bec purchase. On the other hand, a large
purchase from Hydro-Qu6bec would clearly negate the need for
purchases from QFs.95
Because the proceedings were so closely related, the avoided cost
proceeding was eventually wrapped into the Hydro-Qu6bec proceeding.96
Throughout the proceeding, the reasonableness of CMP's projected
avoided costs was heavily disputed. Factors such as price stability and
dispatchability made Hydro-Qu6bec appear to CMP to be a more attrac-
tive alternative. However, as in least cost planning, factors such as envi-
ronmental impacts did not appear to play a part in calculating avoided
costs, and probably would not play any such part today.
89. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 35-A, § 3302 (West 1988).
90. Title 35-A, § 3305.
91. Title 35-A, § 3306. A qualifying facility may be either a cogenerator or a small power
producer.
92. Title 35-A, § 3307.
93. CMP filed its annual long-term avoided cost estimates, during the Hydro-Quebec proceed-
ing on October 30, 1987, in accordance with Chapter 36 of the PUC's rules. Thus, the utility avoids
building a new power plant if the QF can build a plant and produce the power at the same cost as, or
at a lower cost than, it would cost the utility to produce it. A utility fulfills its statutory obligation to
purchase power from qualifying facilities by filling decrements, or blocks of power consisting of a
certain amount of capacity that the utility expects it will need.
94. See generally, Order, supra note 3, at 117. These decrements are blocks of power-generating
or power-displacing capacity, approximately 50 MW in CMP's case.
95. Id.
96. The avoided cost proceeding was Docket No. 87-261.
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4. Maine Energy Policy Act
The Maine Legislature enacted The Maine Energy Policy Act of
1988 (MEPA) while the Hydro-Qu6bec hearings were being held at the
PUC. 7 MEPA codifies least cost energy planning and requires a com-
parative analysis of the alternatives. If available alternatives for energy
are equivalent, MEPA requires the Commission to give preference first to
conservation and demand management and then to power purchased to
qualifying facilities.98 Thus, in order to receive PUC approval for the
Hydro-Qurbec purchase, CMP had to show that Hydro-Qu6bec was su-
perior (i.e., not "equivalent") to demand-side alternatives and power
purchased from qualifying facilities. 99 The wording of MEPA expressly
allows for the consideration of factors such as cost, risk, and diversity of
supply. l"°
5. Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity
Maine public utility law requires that a utility obtain a Certificate of
Public Convenience and Necessity (Certificate) for a major purchase of
generating capacity or energy.10 Whenever a utility proposes to
purchase "any generating capacity, transmission capacity or energy," the
97. Title 35-A, § 3191, states:
Energy Policy
The Legislature finds that it is in the best interests of the State to ensure that Maine
and its electric utilities pursue a least-cost energy plan. The Legislature further finds that a
least-cost energy plan takes into account many factors including cost, risk, diversity of
supply and all available alternatives, including purchases of power from Canadian sources.
When the available alternatives are otherwise equivalent, the Commission shall give prefer-
ence first to conservation and demand management and then to power purchased from
qualifying utilities. Nothing in this section is intended to modify the Commission's author-
ity under section 3133, subsection 9.
98. Id.
99. Order, supra note 3, at 29.
100. And if interpreted broadly, the wording might include the sustainability of the resource,
and whether the resource would contribute to increased pollution, should the PUC choose to ex-
amine these factors.
101. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 35-A, § 3133 (West 1987). A discussion of other states' legal
frameworks for importing Hydro-QuEbec power is beyond the scope of this paper, but it should be
noted that depending on the state, the legal requirements may be minimal. For example, the New
York Power Authority is authorized by state statute to import power for resale to utilities without
approval of the New York Public Service Commission. N.Y. Pun. AUTH. LAW § 1014 (Consol.
Supp. 1991). Thus, in New York, without a regulatory context for evaluating a Hydro-Quebec
purchase, opposition to the James Bay projects has escalated into a political battle, taking the form
of coalition work, grassroots organizing and media publicity. See, e.g., N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 1991,
at A15 (full-page ad, Mario Cuomo, American Express and Catastrophe at James Bay). Hydro-
Quebec has responded with its own public relations blitz. See, e.g., N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 24, 1991, at B5
(full-page ad, James Bay: Let's Talk Sensibly). New York finally agreed to do an environmental
impact assessment and hold public hearings under N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERv. LAW §§ 8-0101-0113
(Consol. 1991), but it is not clear that the scope of the inquiry includes impacts in Canada. Daley,
New York to Reassess Hydro Deal, RUTLAND HERALD, Nov. 6, 1991; New York State Department
20
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PUC must "make specific findings with regard to the need for the
purchase." 102 This was the focus of the PUC proceeding. The require-
ment of specific findings compels the Commission "to decide whether the
particular facilities proposed are necessary."103 Similarly, whenever a
utility proposes to build a new generating facility or transmission line
itself or enter into in a large power purchase contract, it must demon-
strate to the Commission that the resource is part of the utility's overall
least cost plan before the Commission will issue a Certificate."°
Central to the Commission's decision disapproving CMP's Petition
for a Certificate was its determination of which party had the burden of
proof. The Hearing Examiners recommended that the burden of proof,
as to whether the alternatives of conservation and QF power were
equivalent or superior to the proposed Hydro-Qu6bec purchase, be
placed on the proponents of particular alternatives and recommended
approval of the Hydro-Qu6bec purchase."' 5  The Commission
disagreed.10 6
The Commission ruled that to receive a Certificate, CMP had the
burden of persuading the Commission that the Hydro-Qu6bec purchase
was consistent with a least cost plan. 107 In previous orders issued in the
Hydro-Qu6bec proceeding, the Commission had stated that this burden
required CMP to demonstrate both that it needed Hydro-Qu6bec's power
and that the purchase was the least cost source.108 Further, MEPA,
which statutorily established least cost energy planning as state policy,
requires that a proposed power purchase be superior to the alternatives
of conservation and demand management, and power purchased from
of Environmental Conservation, Notice of Intent to Prepare a Draft EIS and Notice of Public Scop-
ing (Oct. 23, 1991). On March 31, 1992, New York Governor Mario Cuomo canceled the $19 billion
contract for hydroelectric power from Qu6bec. Mark Clayton, New York says Non to Hydro-Qudbec;
Crees Rejoice, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MoNrOR, Mar. 31, 1992 at 6.
102. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 35-A, § 3133(6)(A) (West 1987).
103. Order, supra note 3, at 26 (quoting from Re Central Maine Power Co., Nos. U.3238, U.
3239, U. 3356, Slip Op. at 5 (Me. P.U.C. 1979) (Petition for Certificate of Public Convenience and
Necessity at Sears Island)).
104. Order, supra note 3, at 26. Overcapacity is not determinative; the principal inquiry is
whether the plan is least cost over the term of the planning period. Id. at 28.
105. Re Central Maine Power Co., Nos. 88-111, 87-261, Hearing Examiner's Order at 38 (Me.
P.U.C. Dec. 14, 1988). Qu6bec Premiere Robert Bourassa showed a liking for the same type of
burden-shifting procedure when faced with growing opposition to the Great Whale project. "They
(the Crees) say we don't need it (the project)," Bourassa said in a September 1991 interview on
Radio-Canada's Le Point program. "Let them prove it." Phillip Authier, Great Whale must go
ahead: Premier; Inconveniences on the Lifestyle or a Few Hundred People, THE GAZETTE (Mon-
treal), Sept. 17, 1991, at A7.
106. Order, supra note 3, at 36.
107. Id. at 29.
108. Id.
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QFs. "9 This statute implicitly requires the utility to explore the alterna-
tives thoroughly and to demonstrate the superiority of the utility's
proposal.
CMP's preliminary burden concerning the overall comparisons of
alternatives to Hydro-Qu6bec obligated CMP to come forward with af-
firmative evidence consistent with its least cost planning obligations.110
All other parties had "a lesser burden to raise an issue in a manner suffi-
cient to require that the utility address it."'' As the Commission noted
in the Order, however, "neither a production burden nor a burden of
persuasion necessarily must be met by evidence introduced by the party
that has the burden."'1 2 Thus, the Commission viewed the burden of
production for virtually all issues to be on the utility." 3 The Commis-
sion recognized that the utility takes a risk when it decides whether a
party has raised an issue sufficiently to trigger the utility's evidentiary
response.1 14 However, the PUC reasoned that since the utility is the
party in the case with the greatest resources and information, the burden
is not undue." 5
The case analysis raises questions about what the outcome would
have been under a differently constituted Commission. The 2-1 decision
turned on a narrow point of law concerning the burden of proof, and the
dissenting opinion suggested that in a future proceeding, the utility could
sidestep the proof problem under MEPA by simply arguing that the al-
ternatives to the Hydro-Qu6bec proposal were impossible to quantify." 6
6. Environmental Externalities
The question raised by the emphasis on least cost planning in Maine
109. Id. See supra part V.A.4.
110. Order, supra note 3, at 29.
111. Id. at 31-32 (referring to the Order in the Sears Island certificate proceeding, supra note
103). As the Commission explained, a production burden requires a party to produce or present
enough evidence on an issue, or rely on evidence produced by other parties, to allow the trier of fact
to find for that party on the issue. Id. at 30 (citing Me. R. Evid. 301, note; for further discussion, the
Order refers to Poitras v. R. E. Glidden Body Shop, Inc., 430 A.2d 1113, 1118-1120 (Me. 1981)). A
"scintilla" of evidence is not enough to satisfy the production burden. Id. (citing Charles T. McCor-
mick, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 338 (ed. Edward W. Cleary, 2d ed. 1972)). In the Hydro-
Qu6bec case, in order for CMP to receive a Certificate, it had to meet this threshold burden. Id. at
30-35.
112. Order, supra note 3, at 31, (quoting Gendron v. Burnham, 82 A.2d 773 (Me. 1951); State v.
Smith, 389 A.2d 314 (Me. 1978)).
113. Id. at 31.
114. Id. at 33.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 126. The minority opinion stated, "If the company believed for some reason that it
was impossible to present a more definitive examination of cogeneration and conservation, it should
have rigorously argued that position."
[Vol. 28:435
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is whether it is correct not to consider the indirect costs to society of
environmental and social impacts from energy supply and use. Many of
these costs are not easily quantifiable. An example is the loss of areas of
undeveloped territory, whether in western Maine where a transmission
line would cut across the mountains or at James Bay, where, until hydro-
electric development arrived, no roads interrupted the vastness of nature.
However, unless environmental costs are somehow taken into account,
least cost planning works against sustainable development. Rather than
encouraging efficiency and renewable resources, least cost planning can
simply encourage energy generation to gravitate toward regions with the
least popular opposition and the fewest environmental protections.
The current membership of the Maine PUC is now openly hostile to
incorporating any consideration of environmental costs into electric util-
ity regulation. In 1990, the Maine Legislature attempted to move the
PUC closer to adopting a method of incorporating environmental exter-
nalities in the energy planning process by enacting an emergency mea-
sure entitled "An Act to Require the PUC to Conduct an Analysis of the
Comparative Environmental and Economic Impacts of Alternate Energy
Resource Plans."11 The Act mandated that the PUC investigate meth-
ods of incorporating environmental and economic impacts into the con-
sideration of alternative energy resource plans and develop specific
elements of a proposal and a plan for implementing the proposal. 118
Notwithstanding the clear directive of the Maine Legislature, 9 the
majority of the PUC reported back to the Legislature in 1991 without a
proposal or plan for implementing the proposal, and instead recom-
mended that externalities should not be included in utility least cost plan-
ning."' Commissioner Cheryl Harrington issued a minority report,
expressing her disappointment that the PUC had missed the opportunity
to determine the range of costs and benefits. 2 ' With Commissioner Har-
rington's term with the Commission over, the likelihood that the PUC
will incorporate environmental externalities into its decision-making pro-
cess seems slim unless the Legislature mandates such an approach.
The PUC's outright rejection of the integration of economic and en-
vironmental planning and management reflects an outdated, fragmented
117. Priv. & Spec. L. ch. 110, 1989 ME. LAws 2438.
118. Id.
119. Not only is the wording of the statute clear that the PUC was to return with a specific
proposal for the Legislature's consideration, the legislative record confirms that expectation. See
Legis. Rec. 401-02 (2d Reg. Sess. 1990).
120. Me. P.U.C., Report on Environmental and Economic Impacts i-ii (May 1, 1991).
121. Letter from Cheryl Harrington, P.U.C. Commissioner, to the Chairs of the Joint Standing
Committee on Utilities (May 1, 1991).
19931
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approach to energy planning. Indeed, the criticism by the World Com-
mission on Environment and Development 122 of governments for their
"failure to make the bodies whose policy actions degrade the environ-
ment responsible for insuring that their policies prevent the degrada-
tion," 123 takes on new meaning when the administrative body itself
disobeys the Legislature's directive that is intended to make the body
accountable for the impact of its policies. Given the refusal of the Com-
mission even to consider methods of examining environmental externali-
ties, the Legislature should establish by a clearer policy mandate that the
global environmental impacts of energy resource alternatives must be
taken into account in the energy planning process.
B. United States Department of Energy
No federal authorization is required for a United States utility to
import Canadian electricity.124 In the words of an administrator at the
United States Department of Energy (DOE), "the federal government
does not regulate imports of electricity."' 125 However, if construction of
a border-crossing transmission line is proposed to achieve the import of
electricity, the utility must first obtain a Presidential Permit from the
DOE.'26 CMP's Hydro-Qu6bec proposal included the siting and con-
struction of a new high voltage transmission line across the international
border between Qu6bec and Maine through the virtually undeveloped
western mountain region of the state. The Administrator of the Eco-
nomic Regulatory Authority (ERA) of the Department of Energy issues
a Presidential Permit if the transmission facilities are consistent with the
public interest. 27
122. See supra notes 5-20 and accompanying text.
123. OVERVIEW, supra note 8, at 15.
124. On the other hand, Section 202(e) of the Federal Power Act of 1935 (FPA) requires that
any entity subject to the FPA obtain authorization before it exports electric energy to a foreign
country.
125. Letter from Anthony Como, Director of Office of Coal and Electricity, Office of Fuels
Program, Fossil Energy, to Pamela Prodan (Oct. 4, 1991) (discussing federal requirements for inter-
national electricity trade).
126. The term "Presidential Permit" is now a misnomer. When the permit process started in
1939, it originally required the President's signature. Subsequently, the approval function was trans-
ferred to the Chairman of the Federal Power Commission in 1953, to the DOE in 1977, and then to
the Administrator of ERA. ECONOMIC REGULATORY ADMINISTRATION, UNITED STATES DE-
PARTMENT OF ENERGY, ELECTRICITY TRANSACTIONS ACROSS INTERNATIONAL BORDERS - 1984
at 21 (1985).
127. Exec. Order No. 10,485, 18 Fed. Reg. 5397 (1953). The United States Department of En-
ergy describes its regulatory role as follows:
The United States Government requires that a party seeking to construct, operate, and
maintain an electric transmission line crossing United States borders to export or import
power obtain a Presidential Permit. The Department of Energy (DOE) issues Presidential
[Vol. 28:435
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As administered by the DOE, there are two major criteria in the
review for a Presidential Permit. One is a technical reliability require-
ment. The DOE requires that the proposal meet the Northeast Power
Coordination Council (NPCC) reliability requirements before it will al-
low the interconnection to operate.' 2 The DOE considers the effect that
the proposed project would have on the utility's operating reliability, i.e.,
the ability of the existing generation and transmission system to remain
within acceptable voltage, loading and stability limits during normal and
emergency conditions.129 However, the DOE does not consider reliabil-
ity of the source of power in terms of the continued availability of the
resource, or the certainty of construction of sufficient future generation
capacity to meet future demands. In practice, the reliability requirement
is treated as a goal, not a criterion. It is treated as an engineering goal for
the applicant to meet by demonstrating that various technical measures
have been taken by the time the transmission line operates, rather than
criteria that if not met would lead to a denial of the Permit. 130
The second criterion required for the issuance of a Presidential Per-
mit, is an environmental review. In the United States, the passage of the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA)131 required each
federal agency proposing any major federal action "significantly affecting
the quality of the human environment", to include in its report a detailed
environmental impact statement (EIS). This must include "any adverse
environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be
Permits with the concurrence of the Departments of State and Defense. The criterion used
to evaluate applications for permits is that such facilities must be consistent with the public
interest. Considerations of public interest fall into four categories - environment, reliabil-
ity, trade policy, and national security. The DOE reviews applications with respect to
environmental impact and reliability; the Departments of State and Defense review for
considerations of trade effects and security, respectively. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMIN-
ISTRATION, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, UNITED STATES - INTERNA-
TIONAL ELECTRICrrY TRADE 7 (1986). In practice, ERA has never denied a Permit.
128. ECONOMIC REGULATORY ADMINISTRATION, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY,
ELECTRICITY TRANSACTIONS ACROSS INTERNATIONAL BORDERS - 1990 (1991).
129. Id. One of northeastern utilities' concerns with power from Qu6bec has long been the tech-
nical reliability of Hydro-Qu6bec's power transmission system, which is vulnerable to power outages
because of the great distance electricity is transmitted from the hydroelectric sources. U.S. GAO
ELECTRICITY IMPORTS, supra note 65, at 6. Since 1969, Hydro-Quebec has had ten systemwide
failures. Id.
130. To illustrate, steps taken toward solving the reliability problem in the case of the New
England / Hydro-QuEbec Phase II interconnection included maintaining sufficient capacity reserves
within New England to handle the loss of a 2,200 MW interconnection, incorporating a DC inter-
connection into the transmission systems between Qu6bec and New England, and constructing the
interconnection so that the transmission line and associated generating facilities normally can be
operated in isolation from Hydro-Qu~bec's main transmission grid. U.S. GAO CANADIAN POWER
IMPORTS, supra note 64, at 31-32.
131. 42 U.S.C. § 4321-27 (1988).
1993]
25
Prodan: NELPI Energy Law Essay: The Legal Framework for Hydro-Quebec Impo
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1992
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
implemented."1 32 The language of the statute does not in and of itself
limit the affected human environment to that of the United States.
NEPA mandates preparation of an environmental assessment or an
EIS at the federal level in order to evaluate the environmental impacts
associated with the proposal, and to compare alternatives to the propo-
sal, including the alternative of not building the project.1 33
Even when they are empowered to consider environmental impacts,
federal agencies often narrow the scope of the review under NEPA by
concluding that the project would not significantly affect the environ-
ment, thereby making the preparation of an EIS unnecessary.1 34 While
the federal government's involvement in the transmission of electricity is
admittedly small, it is critical, as the denial of the permit would result in
the transmission facilities not being built. This factor calls for a far-
reaching examination of the potential impacts of a proposal. Unfortu-
nately, courts have upheld the refusal of agencies to take the scope of the
EIS beyond the narrow extreme.1 35
The DOE environmental review is geared to the analysis of the im-
pacts of transmission and does not evaluate the consequences of the gen-
eration or use of the energy itself. The failure of the DOE to analyze the
impacts of importing massive amounts of electric energy, other than the
impacts caused by the construction and use of the transmission line, con-
stitutes is a serious omission. This flawed analysis means implicit U.S.
government sanction of electric utilities' support for the development of
large-scale Canadian electric generation projects.
132. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1988). The DOE must consult with numerous other federal agen-
cies in the permitting process for a transmission line. See Environmental Impact Statement Imple-
mentation Plan for the Central Maine Power HVDC Transmission Tie to Hydro-Qu6bec (1988)
[hereinafter EISIP].
133. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). The statement must include:
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be
implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and the mainte-
nance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be involved
in the proposed action should it be implemented.
Id. See also 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25(b) (1991).
134. Cf Gee v. Boyd, 471 U.S. 1058 (1985), denying cert. to Gee v. Hudson, 746 F.2d 1471 (4th
Cir. 1984) (dissenting opinion) (pointing out that lower courts have long been in disarray on what
standard of review to apply to an agency's decision not to undertake an EIS).
135. See Winnebago Tribe of Neb. v. Ray, 621 F.2d 269 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
836 (1980) (affirming the denial of a request for an injunction to bar construction of a proposed 67-
mile power line where the Army Corps of Engineers did not prepare an EIS).
[Vol. 28:435
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Currently, the DOE takes the firm position that an EIS for a Presi-
dential Permit need not address adverse impacts in Canada. 136 The DOE
does not even acknowledge that it should consider impacts in Canada
that would have adverse consequences in the United States, limiting its
review to effects within the transmission line corridor.1 37  Nonetheless,
the DOE must at least consider some impacts other than those associated
with the transmission line, such as damage to populations of migratory
birds that travel to the United States, which that could result from grant-
ing the permit.13 1 Migratory birds are as much a part of the U.S.' envi-
ronment as Canada's.
On its face, because of its broad language NEPA can be assumed to
apply outside the United States absent a conflict with another statutory
duty mandated by Congress, and some courts have so held. 139 In enact-
ing NEPA, Congress intended to "prevent or eliminate damage to the
environment and biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare of
man.'' 4  An agency is not exempt from compliance with NEPA simply
because the effects of an action take place outside the United States. The
law states:
[All agencies of the federal government shall] recognize the worldwide
and long-range character of environmental problems and, where con-
sistent with the foreign policy of the United States, lend appropriate
support to initiatives, resolutions, and programs designed to maximize
136. EISIP, supra note 132, at 4; New England / Hydro-Qu6bec /- 450 kv Transmission Line
Interconnection - Phase II: Final Environmental Impact Statement, at vi (1987) [hereinafter NE-
POOL Phase II EIS]. The NEPOOL Phase II EIS included an appendix supplied by Hydro-Qu6bec
and the applicant in response to comments by the National Audubon Society expressing concern
that hydroelectric generation in Canada could have adverse impacts, particularly on migratory wa-
terfowl. See NEPOOL Phase II EIS, supra Appendix C. Asserting that DOE need not examine
environmental impacts in Canada, DOE nonetheless concluded, based on the submission by Hydro-
Qu6bec and the applicant, that the generation of energy for Phase II Contract sales to NEPOOL
would have no adverse impact on the habitats or populations of migratory bird species that utilize
the James Bay region as a staging area in migrations to or from the United States and points beyond.
NEPOOL Phase II EIS, supra at C-11.
137. EISIP, supra note 132, at 4. The Department's regulations only require the applicant to
submit information in regards to the transmission lines. 10 C.F.R. § 205.322(b) (1991). A statement
of the environmental impacts of the proposed facilities is required, as is "[a] list of threatened or
endangered wildlife or plant life which may be located in the proposed alternative." 10 C.F.R.
§ 205.322(c)(4) (1991).
138. RoSENtrAL & BEYEA, supra note 24, at 29. See In the Matter of Philadelphia Elec. Co.,
10 N.R.C. 437 (1979), ("We are prepared to accept the proposition that, where major federal action
is involved, related activities undertaken abroad that can have a significant impact on the environ-
ment of this country are within NEPA's ambit."). Id at 446.
139. See Sierra Club v. Adams, 578 F.2d 389, 396 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (NEPA required a thorough
discussion of the cultural impacts of the Darion Gap Highway in Panama and Columbia on the
Cuna and Choco Indians); Lake Erie Alliance v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 526 F. Supp. 1063,
1077-78 (W.D. Pa. 1981), aff'd mem, 707 F.2d 1392 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 104 S. Ct. 277 (1983).
140. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1970).
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international cooperation in anticipating and preventing a decline in
the quality of mankind's world environment.141
Because none of the procedures outlined in NEPA contain qualifiers that
could be interpreted as territorial limitations, these procedures indicate
that assessment of environmental consequences was intended to be an
important aspect of federal agencies' planning of activities having im-
pacts outside the U.S.142
Because the granting of a Presidential Permit to build a transmission
line for the delivery of Hydro-Qu6bec contract power would have a di-
rect impact on Hydro-Qu6bec's construction schedule, 143 the DOE must
examine the environmental impacts caused by granting the permit. Even
if it does not consider the extraterritorial effects, such as those visited
upon the Cree people and the wildlife of the James Bay region, the DOE
cannot avoid examination of the impacts in the United States of issuing
the Permit. These impacts would have to include the effects on migra-
tory waterfowl in the United States and the effects of large-scale hydroe-
lectric development on global warming. 44
There is also a basis in Executive Order 12,114 for the international
application of NEPA. 145 However, during the Hydro-Qu6bec proceed-
ing, the DOE maintained that building a transmission line to intercon-
nect with and import power from Canada does not fall into any of the
criteria under Section Z of Executive Order 12,114 under which interna-
tional application of NEPA applies. 46 In addition, the DOE claimed
that "various environmental reviews are conducted by Canadian utilities,
provincial governments, and the Canadian federal government whenever
a major project is proposed for development .... The Canadian govern-
ment provides opportunities for the expression of public concern about
141. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(F) (1988).
142. Comment, The Extraterritorial Scope of NEPA's Environmental Impact Statement Require-
ment, 74 MICH. L. REV. 349, 364 (1975).
143. See discussion of impact of export contracts on construction schedule supra note 66.
144. See discussion on global warming supra note 26.
145. Exec. Order No. 12,114, 44 Fed. Reg. 1957 (1979) directs every federal agency to publish
appropriate procedures for evaluating the environmental impacts of major federal actions outside the
U.S., specifically, "actions significantly affecting the environment of the global commons outside the
jurisdiction of any nation (e.g. the oceans or Antarctica)." The failure of the order to expressly
recognize other components of the global commons should not necessarily prevent the application of
this order to the atmosphere and other parts of the global ecosystem, such as migratory wildlife
outside the jurisdiction of a single nation. The oceans or Antarctica are meant only to be examples.
Although migratory shorebirds have been the subject of the long-standing the 1916 Migratory Bird
Treaty between the United States and Canada, encoded at 16 U.S.C. § 703, which recognized their
international status, the applicability of the implementing statute, the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, to
James Bay is not clear. ROSENTHAL & BEYEA, supra note 24, at 29. However, the existence of the
treaty reinforces the basis for the DOE to consider effects on migratory wildlife.
146. EISIP, supra note 132, at 4.
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the environment in those proceedings."147 As discussed elsewhere in this
paper, the Canadian review process is deficient in many ways, including
the public review component, which is not mandatory.148
In the CMP EIS process, the DOE refused to even consider the en-
vironmental impacts of the James Bay projects. However, in the NE-
POOL Phase II EIS process, the DOE had treated the question of
environmental impacts from the projects as a factual issue. 149 Based on
information submitted by Hydro-Qu6bec and the applicant, the DOE
concluded that no significant adverse impacts in the James Bay region
had occurred or were projected to occur because of the operation of ex-
isting or proposed hydroelectric facilities at James Bay. 50 Both ap-
proaches are fundamentally flawed.
When courts hold that NEPA does not apply extraterritorially,' 5 '
they generally reason that a longstanding doctrine, called the Foley doc-
trine, prevents the extraterritorial application of United States laws on
the grounds that such application would result in a clash with the laws of
foreign nations."5 2 However, such a sovereignty argument fails because
the EIS process by which an agency takes account of the environmental
impact of a project occurs in the United States. International application
of NEPA would only require that federal agencies scrutinize actions that
might affect the environment. Such a process does not interfere with a
foreign country's laws.
Even if Congress did not intend NEPA to apply extraterritorially,
the wording of the Endangered Species Act (ESA) 153 is much clearer in
this respect.154 Section 7 of the ESA requires that federal agencies take
no action that would jeopardize any endangered or threatened species or
its habitat.' Lower courts have interpreted Section 7 of the ESA to be
147. Id. at 4.
148. See supra Part III, notes 38-63 and accompanying text.
149. See Response to comments of National Audubon Society, NEPOOL Phase II EIS, supra
note 136, at C-11, F-66.
150. Id.
151. Envtl. Defense Fund v. Massey, 141 F. Supp. 1296 (D.D.C. 1991). See United States v.
Mitchell, 553 F.2d 996 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding that if environmental legislation is to be applied
outside the boundaries of the United States, Congress's intent that it be so must be clearly
expressed).
152. See Foley Bros. Inc. v. Filarso, 336 U.S. 282 (1949).
153. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-44 (1991).
154. Contra Justice Stevens, concurring in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992)
(failing to reach the question of extraterritorial application of Section 7, denying plaintiffs standing.)
155. Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act of 1973 requires consultation with the Department
of the Interior:
[E]ach Federal agency shall, in consultation with and with the assistance of the Secretary,
insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency (hereinafter in this
section referred to as an "agency action") is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence
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unequivocal in the ESA's application to foreign soils. 156
In Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, the Court held that Section 7
is plain and unambiguous and the "language admits of no exception."1 57
However, the DOE and the Department of the Interior have not applied
the ESA as Congress intended.158 Pursuant to the ESA, the DOE re-
quests, and the Department of the Interior provides, information on the
presence of federally listed and proposed endangered or threatened spe-
cies known to exist within the project area, the transmission line corri-
dor.159 Yet the ESA defines "endangered species" without geographic
limitation.1 ° Thus, the DOE's contention that it need consider only the
impacts of the transmission line and not the environment outside the
United States is incorrect. Under the ESA, the agency should consider
whether the granting of a Presidential Permit will affect any endangered
or threatened species, regardless of whether the species "located in the
proposed alternative."1'' For Congress to require the listing of all spe-
cies worldwide that are endangered, and then not to require federal agen-
cies to take protective action would be senseless.
Finally, aside from the deficiencies in the DOE's review, another
major fault with the Presidential Permit process is that the magnitude of
the impacts of the required electrical energy development at the source is
irrelevant to the authority of the federal government to evaluate an im-
port proposal. Only the proposal of a new transmission line crossing the
border will trigger the federal permitting process. By way of example,
while the CMP contract with Hydro-Qu6bec required a Presidential Per-
mit because it involved the construction of a tie line interconnecting the
utilities, the equally massive New York Power Authority contract with
Hydro-Qu6bee does not require one. The New York contract involves
of any endangered species or threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse
modification of habitat of such species .... 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1991).
156. John L. Beiers, Comment, The International Applicability of Section 7 of the Endangered
SpeciesAct of 1973, 29 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 171, 202 (1989). See Defenders of Wildlife v. Lujan,
911 F.2d 117 (8th Cir. 1990), rev'don other grounds, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130
(1992).
157. Comment, supra note 142 (quoting Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 173
(1978)).
158. The United States Fish and Wildlife Service and the National Marine Fisheries Service at
one time issued a joint rule requiring that every federal agency "insure that its activities or programs
in the United States, upon the high seas, and in foreign countries will not jeopardize the continued
existence of a listed species." 43 Fed. Reg. 874 (1978) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. § 402.01) (empha-
sis added). The rule was changed in 1986 to reinterpret Section 7 to require consultation only for
actions taken in the United States or on the high seas. Defenders of Wildlife, 911 F.2d at 118.
159. See 10 C.F.R. § 205.322(c) (1991).
160. Defenders of Wildlife, 911 F.2d at 123.
161. 10 C.F.R. § 205.322(c) (1991).
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purchases over existing transmission lines. 162
In sum, the DOE presently interprets the federal legal framework to
allow the United States government to disassociate itself entirely from
what the environmental impacts might be in Canada.1 63 Such an ap-
proach only prolongs the inability of institutions to come to grips with
the need to treat the planet as one system made up of many ecosystems
transcending artificial boundaries. So long as such a narrow perspective
reigns as to what constitutes the legitimate scope of investigation into
environmental impacts on the human environment, huge, foreign, en-
ergy-related projects will continue to be seen by United States utilities
and investors as feasible and attractive, and developing sustainability will
be an unattainable goal.
Since the world community of nations has failed to address the most
serious problems of ozone depletion, destruction of habitat, pollution,
and climate change, it is imperative that each nation analyze the bound-
ary-transcending implications of its decisions. The DOE should broaden
its scope of inquiry into large-scale importation of energy and fully con-
sider the cumulative environmental impacts of such imports in the con-
text of whole ecosystems. In addition, the federal government should
pass new legislation prohibiting investments in large scale energy devel-
opments both inside and outside the United States unless it is demon-
strated that the developments will not compromise the ability of future
generations to meet their own needs. Only then can it fairly be said that
the United States government is willing to take responsibility for the im-
pact of energy policies that cause environmental damage.
VII. CANADIAN PROVINCIAL AND FEDERAL LAW
A. Qudbec Law
In Qu6bec, the constant struggle of Canadian environmental groups
162. To further illustrate the problem that, as implemented by the DOE, the federal permitting
process involved in electricity imports is not in any way intended to regulate or take account of the
magnitude of the consequences of the generation, transmission or use of the energy, but rather sim-
ply the effects of the construction and ongoing maintenance of the energy transmission facilities,
contrast the lack of DOE review of the two blocks of 500 MW under the New York Power Author-
ity's multi-billion dollar deal with Hydro-Qu6bec, with that involved in DOE Docket PP-81. The
latter did require a Presidential Permit, which was issued on September 24, 1984 to Maine Public
Service Co., "authoriz[ing] the extension of a 7.2 kV distribution line from the New Brunswick
Electric Power Commission to provide electric service to a [single] isolated residence in the United
States." See ECONOMIC REGULATORY ADMINISTRATION, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF EN-
ERGY, supra note 126, at 16-17.
163. See Response to comments filed by National Audubon Society, NEPOOL Phase II EIS,
supra note 136, at 4-20 - 4-25.
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against the first James Bay projects forced the Qu6bec provincial govern-
ment to institute environmental protection policies and requirements
where previously none had existed. 164 However, it has been relatively
easy for utilities to obtain waivers of environmental requirements, and
the proponents of the projects have largely been responsible for preparing
their own environmental impact assessments. Further, in Quebec, since
an environmental assessment for a hydroelectric project is prepared only
after a decision to proceed has been made, the study necessarily can serve
only to mitigate the severity of a proposed project. Qu6bec law requires
no more than mitigation; there is no provision in Qu6bec law for the
rejection of a hydroelectric project. In that sense there is a presumption
that all hydroelectric development is necessary, and that any adverse ef-
fects can be mitigated.
The Qu6bec Environmental Quality Act contains particular provi-
sions that apply to the James Bay Region, south of the 55th parallel,
including certain principles that are supposed to be duly considered.1 65
The principles include the protection of: hunting, fishing and trapping
rights; native people, their societies, communities and economy; the envi-
ronment; and wildlife.1 66 Perhaps most importantly, the Act requires the
various committees and governmental entities to give due consideration
to the principle of "the participation of the Crees in the application of the
environmental and social protection regime provided for" in the Act. 167
The regime provides for participation of the Cree in Evaluation and
Review Committees that make recommendations regarding the advisabil-
ity of submitting or not submitting projects to the review and assessment
procedure. 6 The Committees make recommendations to the Minister
164. Jan Beyea et al., Long-Term Threats to Canada's James Bay from Hydroelectric Develop-
ment, 16 INFORMATION NORTH, No. 3, at 4 (Sept. 1990) [hereinafter Long-Term Threats].
165. See R.R.Q. (1981), c. Q-2, r. 152, S.Q. 261 (Butterworths). This is the regulation pursuant
to the Quebec Environmental Quality Act, R.S.Q. c. Q-2, amended by S.Q. 1009, C-26, respecting
the environmental and social impact assessment and review procedures applicable to the territory of
James Bay and Northern Quebec. Section 3 of the rule describes two types of impact assessment
statements, the first, a preliminary statement evaluating the alternatives for the site of a project, and
the second, a detailed statement evaluating all the effects of the accepted project on the environmen-
tal and social milieu. Section 5 describes required elements of any environmental and social impact
statement, including descriptions of environment and social milieu, evaluation of the impacts the
project is likely to have, descriptions of reasonable alternatives to the site of the project, reasonable
alternatives to certain elements of the project, and corrective and restorative measures to reduce or
minimize negative effects of the project.
166. Id.
167. R.R.Q. (1981), c. Q-2, r. 152(0, S.Q. 262 (Butterworths).
168. R.R.Q. (1981), c. Q-2, r. 162, S.Q. 265 (Butterworths).
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of Environment on the project, conditions to impose, and further re-
search or studies. 169 This advisory role on the Review Committee ap-
pears to be the most significant set of rights granted the Cree under the
Qu6bec Environmental Quality Act. Yet because the Cree appoint only
two of the five members of the Committee, with the other three ap-
pointed by the Qu6bec government, it is a most limited concession.1 70 In
addition, the Minister need not follow the recommendations of the Re-
view Committee.17 1 Moreover, notwithstanding the provisions for as-
sessment, the entire LaGrande complex at James Bay was statutorily
exempted from the assessment and review procedure described in the
Act. 172
B. Canadian Federal Framework
1. National Energy Board
In Canada, electricity exports are regulated by the Canadian Na-
tional Energy Board (NEB or Board). At the time of the CMP-Hydro-
Quebec contract, the NEB was limited under the 1959 Act of Parliament
creating the Board to two factors in its consideration of an application
for an electricity export license:
1) power to be exported must be excess to Canadian needs, 7 and
2) the price charged must be in the public interest.IT*Under NEB
regulation adopted to implement the 1959 National Energy Board Act,
power exports from Canada had to be at prices reasonably close to that
of alternative power and energy available to the purchaser, typically a
coal plant proxy.175
When Canada Bill C-23 went into effect in June 1990, the powers of
the NEB declined. The new law does away with the guarantee of public
hearings, and any applicable federal environmental protections, in what
is likely an unconstitutional delegation of powers from the federal to the
provincial government.1 76 Under Bill C-23, the NEB defers to the af-
fected provinces consideration of the impacts of the export on the envi-
ronment. Since Qu6bec has only a cursory framework for dealing with
169. Id.
170. R.R.Q. (1981), c. Q-2, r. 151, S.Q. 261 (Butterworths).
171. R.R.Q. (1981), c. Q-2, r. 164, S.Q. 265 (Butterworths).
172. R.R.Q. (1981), c. Q-2, r. 209, S.Q. 277 (Butterworths).
173. National Energy Board, Regulations for Carrying into Effect the Provisions of Part VI of
the NEB Act § (6)(2)(w) (1986) [hereinafter NEB Reg.].
174. NEB Reg. § (6)(2)(z).
175. NEB Reg. § (6)(2)(z); U.S. GAO CANADIAN POWER IMPORTS, supra note 64, at 27-30.
176. See discussion concerning the Oldman decision, infra notes 183-86 and accompanying text,
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the environmental impacts of energy-related development, the NEB has
in practice waived the environmental assessment requirement.
2. Federal Environmental Assessment Review Process
In Canada, two distinct legal entities can prompt environmental im-
pact assessments: the federal government or a province.177 However,
responsibility for producing environmental statements for the various
sectors of the Canadian government is a gray area, with many shared
jurisdictions, joint ventures and waivers among the provincial utilities,
the provincial governments, and the federal government. 178 Although, as
described below, the federal courts have recently required environmental
impact assessments where the federal government has jurisdiction, there
remain many deficiencies in the process.
Until recently, there was no Canadian federal statutory requirement
that an environmental impact statement be prepared for a hydroelectric
project. The federal Cabinet adopted the federal Environmental Assess-
ment Review Process (EARP) in 1973, amended it in 1977, but until the
Cabinet codified it as an Order-in-Council in 1984,179 this review process
was policy rather than a declaration of law, precluding litigation and pro-
viding no legal recourse of appeal such as that available to U.S. citizens
through NEPA. Thus, until codification in the form of a Guidelines Or-
der, Canadian courts virtually have been closed as an avenue to redress
inadequate evaluation of development projects.18 0 Likewise, clarification
of the applicability of the EARP has only recently begun.
Two recent cases, Friends of the Oldman River Society v. Canada
Minister of Transport 18 1 and Canadian Wildlife Federation v. Canada
Minister of the Environment,18 2 make clear that the Guidelines Order is
binding upon the Minister of the Environment and upon the Ministers of
other departments. In Oldman, the Canadian Supreme Court held that
the duty under the EARP of the Minister of Transport to take into ac-
count the environmental impact of a project is supplemental to the Min-
ister's responsibility under the Navigable Waters Protection Act. The
in which the Supreme Court held that the federal EARP Guidelines Order requiring an environmen-
tal assessment is mandatory.
177. Long-Term Threats, supra note 164, at 4.
178. Id.
179. EARP Guidelines Order, supra note 62 at 2794.
180. Long-Term Threats, supra note 164 at 5.
181. [1992] 88 D.L.R.(4th) 1.
182. [1989] 3 F.C. 309 (T.D.), aff'd (1989), 99 N.R. 72 (F.C.A.).
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objective of the Guidelines Order is "to make environmental impact as-
sessment an essential component of federal decisiomaking."18 3 Thus,
the independent environmental review outlined by the EARP is
mandatory.
The Oldman court, refusing to accept the government's argument
that the concept of the environment is confined to the biophysical envi-
ronment alone, acknowledged the importance of the principal of inte-
grated economic and environmental planning, referring to the
Brundtland Report of the World Commission on Environment and De-
velopment (WCED).184 The court noted that the Canadian Council of
Resource and Environment Ministers, in its Report of the National Task
Force on Environment and Economy, stated:
Our recommendations reflect the principles that we hold in common
with the World Commission on Environment and Development
(WCED). These include the fundamental belief that environmental
and economic planning cannot proceed in separate spheres. Long-
term economic growth depends on a healthy environment. It also af-
fects the environment in many ways. Ensuring environmentally sound
and sustainable economic development requires the technology and
wealth that is generated by continued economic growth. Economic
and environmental planning and management must therefore be
integrated.18 5
The court continued, "[S]urely the potential consequences for a commu-
nity's livelihood, health and other social matters from environmental
change are integral to decision-making on matters affecting environmen-
tal quality .... ,,86
In 1989, a Saskatchewan court quashed a construction license for an
almost completed dam project and ordered the federal Minister of the
Environment to comply with the EARP Guidelines Order, setting an im-
portant precedent for James Bay.187 The Minister had issued the license
under the International Rivers Improvement Act in 1988. The federal
appeals court in Canadian Wildlife Federation rebuked the Canadian
government for failing to conduct its own environmental review of the
dam project. The court said the government had not enforced its own
regulations, relying on the plain meaning of the text of the Guidelines
183. Friends of the Oldman River Soc'y v. Canada (Minister of Transp.), [1992] 88 D.L.R. (4th)
1, at 24.
184. Id. at 22. See supra notes 4-20 and accompanying discussion of WCED.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Canadian Wildlife Fed'n v. Canada (Minister of the Env't), [1989] 3 F.C. 309 (T.D.), aff'd
(1989), 99 N.R. 72 (F.C.A.).
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Order and the legislative intent in concluding that the Guidelines are
mandatory.1 8
One reason for the past uncertainty as to whether the EARP is
mandatory has been that it is codified in the form of a Guidelines Order
that lacks any explicit statutory enforcement or penalty mechanism. 189
However, the Oldman Court stated that because the regulatory scheme is
law, it may be enforced through prerogative relief. 190 Stated otherwise,
Parliament has delegated its authority to the Minister who has authority
to issue directives having the full force of law.191 As to its scope, the
EARP Guidelines apply to any proposal requiring "an initiative, under-
taking or activity for which the government of Canada has a decision-
making responsibility." '192 If the proposal would produce significant
adverse environmental impacts, or if the potential adverse environmental
impacts that may be caused by the proposal are unknown, or if public
concern about the proposal is such that a public review is desirable, the
department with decision making authority is to refer the proposal to the
Minister of the Environment for public review. 193
Notwithstanding the mandatory nature of the Guidelines, where a
Canadian government entity has a regulatory function with respect to a
proposal, the Guidelines apply to the entity "only if there is no legal
impediment to or duplication resulting from the application of the guide-
lines." '19 4 Thus, while the Court has ruled that the Guidelines Order may
be enforced, it also has acknowledged that any "legal impediment", un-
defined in the statute, may curtail their application. 95 Presumably, the
existence of the James Bay Treaty could be such an impediment.
A flaw in the Canadian environmental assessment process is that,
unlike the United States process of preparing an environmental impact
statement, no consideration of alternatives is required. 196 In addition,
projects are examined individually, with no provision in the statute for
taking into account the cumulative impacts of all the projects proposed.
Further, while the scope of the public review of a proposal may include
188. 99 N.R. 72, 73-74 (F.C.A.).
189. ROSENTHAL & BEYEA, supra note 24, at 23. See EARP Guidelines Order, supra note 62.
190. See Friends of the Oldman River Soc'y v. Canada (Minister of Transp.), [1992] 88 D.L.R.
1.
191. Id.
192. EARP Guidelines Order, supra note 62. See also Friends of the Oldman River Soc'y v.
Canada (Minister of Transp.), [1992] 88 D.L.R. 1.
193. EARP Guidelines Order, supra note 62, at 2798.
194. Id. at 2796.
195. See Friends of the Oldman River Soc'y v. Canada (Minister of Transp.), [1992] 88 D.L.R.
1.
196. Grand Chief Matthew Coon Come, supra note 42.
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the general socio-economic effects and the need for the proposal, such a
review will only take place subject to the approval of the Environment
Minister and the Minister of the decisionmaking department. 97
Finally, the public review component of the Guidelines appears to
be only for palliative effect. Witnesses are not to be sworn or subpoe-
naed. 19' The review panel need not accept the relevance of any informa-
tion submitted to it.199 As the Guidelines are written, neither are public
hearings always required by the review process. 2" The Guidelines state
that where environmental regulation takes place independently of the
federal review process, duplication of public reviews is to be avoided.20 1
Joint federal/provincial review may be negotiated.2"2 Thus, there is no
guarantee that the public has meaningful input and participation in deci-
sions concerning the environment under the federal review process.
VIII. UNITED STATES-CANADA FREE-TRADE AGREEMENT
The primary provision of international law that relates to the James
Bay developments is the United States - Canada Free-Trade Agreement
(FTA).20 3 It is beyond the scope of this paper to assess how aspects of
international law other than the FTA could apply to James Bay develop-
ments. It should be noted that the international community is becoming
involved in the Hydro-Qu6bec controversy. For example, the Interna-
tional Water Tribunal in Amsterdam, a foundation financed by several
European nations, held hearings in February 1992 on the Hydro-Quebec
proposal.20
197. EARP Guidelines Order, supra note 62, at 2799. Paragraph 25 (1)(b) provides for an exami-
nation of the directly related social impacts of the environmental effects.
198. lId
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 2795.
202. Id.
203. The text of the FTA is published in 27 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 293 (1988). See also
United States - Canada Free- Trade Agreement Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-449,
102 Stat. 1851 (1988). In general, with respect to energy, the world's nations have been slow to
realize their common interest in the environmental problems related to energy policy. See CALD-
WELL, supra note 4, at 191-193. Although Canada has been in the forefront of the acid rain issue,
pressuring the United States to abate the problem, it has not given much attention to problems of
deforestation and flooding of the northern forest, which are also matters of international conse-
quence. For an analysis of how international case law, various doctrines, conventions, and treaties
might possibly apply to the purchase of electricity from Hydro-Quhbec by the New York Power
Authority, see Ian M. Paregol, Comment, Shocking Revelations at Hydro-Qudbec: The Environmen-
tal and Legal Consequences of the Qudbec-New York Power Line, 7 DICK. J. INT'L L., 155 (1988).
204. Dennis Bueckert, James Bay Faces International Hearings, GLOBE AND MAIL, Jan. 6, 1992,
at Bl. Although not legally binding, the Tribunal's verdicts are widely reported in Europe and
elsewhere. Id. While recognizing that Hydro-Quebec and the provincial government had entered
into agreements with the Cree people, the Tribunal questioned whether the contracts adequately
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The rules of the FTA contemplate substantially tariff-free trade be-
tween the two countries with neither non-tariff barriers to foreign goods
nor domestic subsidies, yet the rules are less than clear when applied to
environmental regulations that effectively bar foreign goods.20 5 Concern
for the ecological dimensions of a free trade policy was not foremost in
the drafters' minds. There is a struggle to reconcile not only trade and
environment, but also traditional concepts of sovereignty and changing
standards of international conduct.20 6
An analysis of the FTA by Canadian environmental organizations
in 1988 concluded that the FTA would likely have disastrous conse-
quences for the environment and would fundamentally undermine prin-
ciples of environmental protection and sustainable resource
management.20 7 Indeed, since the implementation of the FTA, two of
the largest energy projects in Canadian history have received export
licenses: the Mackenzie Delta natural gas development and associated
pipeline and the James Bay hydroelectric development in Northern Qu6-
bec. The FTA narrows the circumstances in which a country may use
regulatory devices that could control the development of energy re-
sources for export markets.20 It also abolishes the right under the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade rules to use export taxes as a
mechanism for resource management and conservation.20 9
Although electricity was already in many ways a free trade area, the
passage of the FTA in 1988 clearly curtailed the Canadian government's
ability to impede hydroelectric development for energy export.210 Prior
to passage of the FTA, Canadian utilities had to structure their rates so
reflected Cree aspirations for self-determination and control over natural resources. Ronald Van der
Krol, Business and the Environment; Tribunal Flexes its Muscles, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 26, (1992), at
114.
205. Stephen L. Kass and Michael B. Gerrard, International Trade, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 24, 1992, at
3.
206. Id.
207. Steven Shrybman, Selling the Environment Short. An Environmental Assessment of the First
Two Years of Free Trade Between Canada and the United States, 2 (1991) (CANADIAN ENVIRON-
MENTAL LAW AssOcIATIoN).
208. See FTA Art. 904, 27 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 344 (1988).
209. Compare General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, U.S.-Canada article
XX(g) [hereinafter GATr], allowing trade restrictions for the purpose of the conservation of exhaus-
tible natural resources, with Bill C-130, implementing the FTA in Canada, which compels the Na-
tional Energy Board (NEB) to issue an export license even in the face of shortages. See also
Shrybman, supra note 207. Now, although terms and conditions may attach to an NEB license, the
NEB cannot withhold approval for environmental reasons. Id.; Quebec v. Canada (Nat'l Energy
Board), [1991] 3F.C. 443, 444 (F.C.A.) ("Authorities other than the Board are responsible for the
serious environmental questions raised by the construction of electrical energy production
facilities.").
210. ROSENTHAL & BEYEA, supra note 24, at 25-26. See supra part VI.B.I.
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that they would not be below the least-cost alternative in the United
States211 The National Energy Board also had to make a determination
that the granting of a particular energy export license would be in Can-
ada's best interest.212 When challenged and faced with pressure from
United States business interests, the NEB recently abandoned virtually
all of its regulatory authority and ruled that it would only examine pro-
posed energy export contracts for "commercial substance" and "would
generally presume that where contracts are freely negotiated at arm's
length, they are in the public as well as the private interest" and that the
Board would intervene only in exceptional circumstances.213 Now, a Ca-
nadian utility may set its rates regardless of the United States competi-
tion's prices.21 4
The possibility that Qu6bec might break away from the rest of Can-
ada raises questions about the province's ability to participate in the FTA
as a separate entity. A Qu6bec commission set up to study Qu6bec's fu-
ture relationship with Canada concluded that the province would be re-
quired to seek membership as a separate entity.215 Authorities disagree
as to whether Qu6bec's economic relationship with the United States
would be damaged. 2 6 The Qu6bec government's interventionist stance
in its economy might not be so acceptable if Qu6bec were an independent
country.217
It is also uncertain whether the northern two-thirds of Qu6bec
would accompany a secessionist Qu6bec. The Assembly of First Nations
maintains that any recognition of French-Canadian rights to promote
and preserve identity must be matched by equally strong recognition of
211. NEB Reg. § (6)(2)(z), supra note 173.
212. Id. § (6)(2)(w); Shrybman, supra note 207 at 5.
213. Shrybman, supra note 202, at 5 (quoting NEB decision).
214. ROSENTHAL & BEYEA, supra note 22, at 26.
215. Daily Report for Executives (BNA) No. 62, at A-8 (Apr. 1, 1991).
216. Id.
217. Id. United States companies reacted to revelations that Hydro-Qu6bec has contracts with
industrial customers in Qu6bec that provide for sales of electricity at less than market rates, by
setting the anti-dumping and anti-subsidy provisions of the FTA into motion. See About Business,
OTrAWA CrrizEN, Oct. 17, 1991, at Cl. The United States International Trade Commission found
that the United States magnesium industry suffered as a result of a Qu6bec competitor's imports and
the Commerce Department found the imports to be subsidized by cheap power from Hydro-Qu6bec.
Id. Reportedly, Hydro-Qu6bec expected to lose money on its 25-year Norsk-Hydro contract when it
negotiated the deal. Graeme Hamilton, Hydro Expected Loss on Norsk Deal study; Qudbec Utility is
Target of Probe by U.S. Commerce Department, THE GAZETrE (Montreal), Jan. 17, 1992, at A5. On
July 7, 1992, the United States Commerce Department recommended that magnesium imports be
subject to duties totalling 53% for unfair trade practices. John Saunders, Canada Loses Another
Trade Row, GLOBE AND MAIL (Toronto), July 8, 1992 at B3.
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First Nations' rights to promote and preserve aboriginals' identities.21
In considering alternatives to the FTA that would encourage sus-
tainable development, one has to ask how trade rules should operate in
order to protect natural resources. Since the availability of natural re-
sources is finite, the use of natural resources should be conservative. But
under the current free trade rules, laws that protect the environment can
be seen as barriers to trade. If the rules of free trade were to treat natural
resources as finite, then wholesale exploitation the environment leading
to serious deterioration of natural resources would be viewed as unfair
borrowing against future generations. Thus, under an enlightened view
of the principles of the FTA, unsustainable use of natural resources for
short term profit would represent an unfair subsidy and would be
outlawed.
IX. CONCLUSION
The assessment of United States utilities that Canadian hydropower
is clean can only have come about because its primary effects are far
removed from the experience of United States citizens and regulators.
The lack of a legal requirement in the United States that a government
authority examine and justify the effects in Canada of the importation of
electricity has allowed this claim to go virtually unchecked by utilities.
Of all the decisions that affect the environment, energy choices have
the potential to have the greatest impact. A complex maze has developed
in the form of international agreements, various federal and state laws
and regulations. Many purport to consider the environmental impacts of
government decisions. Yet, the decision-making process around energy
matters does not take into account the full environmental consequences
of those decisions. Problems of ozone depletion, climate change, and
acid rain have yet to be addressed. Equally important, energy policy-
makers have not adequately considered the foremost concerns of people
who are most directly affected by energy decisions. A concept of envi-
ronmental quality confined to the biophysical environment is unduly nar-
row and contrary to common understanding. After all, consequences for
a population's livelihood, culture, and future well-being are integral to an
accurate concept of environmental quality.
As they have been implemented, United States and Canadian laws
218. See William Johnson, Mercredi Cannot Understand Why Qudbec Is So Hostile, THE GA-
zErE (Montreal), Mar. 7, 1992, at B3. Further, since the territories of the First Nations cover most
of Quebec, it cannot be presumed that the present boundaries of the province would automatically be
those of a sovereign new state.
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that form the framework for Hydro-Qu6bec imports are deficient in that
they do not adequately weigh the environmental and social consequences
of the hydroelectric development at James Bay. In the United States,
while many of the applicable laws and regulations could be interpreted to
consider the global impacts of development and include the goal of sus-
tainable development, the affected government agencies and many courts
are not ready to do so. A remedial legislative approach is needed to
strengthen the framework.
Legislation at the state and federal levels must require specific con-
sideration of the global environmental impacts of energy decisions. It is
our own future that is at stake in this environmentally connected world.
Assuming we have moved into an era of a global economy, new provi-
sions must be built into our laws to integrate economic and environmen-
tal planning. A broader interpretation of concepts like "least cost" and
"public interest" is needed. Planners and regulators should at least at-
tempt to look at whole ecosystems when assessing the impacts of
development.
In addition, more emphasis is needed on the importance of giving
citizens full access to information which can facilitate their understand-
ing of the connection between individual consumption decisions and the
global impacts of those decisions. Then, even if we cannot prevent an-
other nation from carrying out a policy contrary to the principles of sus-
tainable development, at least we can make an informed decision not to
encourage such destruction by participating in the making of its profit.
1993]
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